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2Abstract
The Oﬃce of Combination Products (OCP), within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
was created formally by statute in December, 2002. Upon its creation, the Oﬃce became broadly
responsible for overseeing the regulation of combination products, or products that involve compo-
nents that would normally be regulated under diﬀerent FDA Centers. But the statutory creation
of this Oﬃce in one day represented the culmination of nearly sixty-ﬁve years of both technological
advancement in the products submitted to the FDA and amassed experience within the FDA and
its administrative predecessors for managing those products in the name of the public safety. To
understand the need for this Oﬃce and its primary goals of timely, eﬀective and clear regulation
of these groundbreaking technologies, the history of the FDA with respect to the advent of these
combination products must be examined chronologically. Drafts of statutes, administrative propos-
als oﬀered for public comment, and lengthy debates from Capitol Hill all illustrate the journey that
led inevitably to the OCP as a ﬁnal destination. Nearly twenty-four months have passed since the
OCP was created, so an analysis of its initial progress through an explanation of the changes it has
eﬀected is necessary. Both combination product manufacturers and FDA jurisdiction oﬃcers have
beneﬁted from industry guidances, enhanced inter-Center communication, and a wealth of expertise
provided by FDA employees eager to streamline the regulatory pathways to be navigated. Thus, the
next three years within the OCP would seem to promise similar success for product manufacturers,
the FDA and the American public.
Introduction
3The [Oﬃce of Combination Products] “is a signiﬁcant step to increase the
eﬃciency and timeliness of the procedures that make these important prod-
ucts available to patients. I also believe that the activities of this new oﬃce
will help provide insights into how the Commissioner’s oﬃce can better
support a range of issues that cut across the three product centers, and
thus bring greater uniformity and coherence to our processes.1
Mark B. McClellan, M.D., Ph.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs.
By 2002, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had spent nearly two decades attempting to regulate
in an orderly and thorough manner those new products that seemed to be more than just a new drug or
a new biological product, or simply a medical device, but rather a combination of more than one of those
categories. The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA), signed into law on October
26, 2002 by President George W. Bush,2 explicitly called for a formalization of that regulation. Among
the other amendments that MDUFMA made to the statutory framework of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), the organic statute of the FDA, it required the FDA to establish an Oﬃce
of Combination Products within sixty days “to ensure the prompt assignment of combination products to
agency centers, the timely and eﬀective premarket review of such products, and consistent and appropriate
postmarket regulation of like products subject to the same statutory requirements to the extent permitted by
law.”3 On December 31, 2002, FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan notiﬁed the American public that this
Oﬃce had indeed been created and that, as a new part of the Oﬃce of the Commissioner, its responsibilities
would include the regulation of the entire “life cycle of combination products, including jurisdiction decisions
as well as the timeliness and eﬀectiveness of pre-market review, and the consistency and appropriateness of
2Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (hereinafter “MDUFMA”), Pub. L. No. 107-250, 21 U.S.C. §
301 et seq. (2002); President’s Statement on Signing the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, 38 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1874 (November 4, 2002).
3MDUFMA § 204(3), 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2004). Interestingly, the President’s statement, supra note 2, made no mention of
the new Oﬃce or its role.
4post-market regulation.”4
Nearly twenty-four months later, this Oﬃce of Combination Products (OCP) has survived public hearings
and opportunities for comment regarding its structure and regulatory policies, as well as its ﬁrst mandatory
Annual Report to Congress.5 In addition, it has promulgated multiple regulations to manage its Congres-
sional responsibilities.6 Thus, the time is right to undertake a critical review of the initial steps taken by
the FDA to institute the OCP. The goal of this paper is to elucidate the current structure of the OCP by
examining the chain of historical developments that ultimately required its creation.
Section I introduces the pertinent provisions of the FDCA7 and traces the statutory development of how
the FDA has deﬁned a drug, a medical device, and a biological product since the inception of the FDCA.
Armed with those deﬁnitions, Section I then traces the regulatory procedures for each of those three product
categories to illustrate the diversity of approval procedures that exist within the FDA. This illustration
throws into relief the long-felt need for the OCP to coordinate the regulation of products that implicate
more than one product category. Section II details the historical and noteworthy developments surrounding
the initial appearance of and subsequent increase in combination products during the latter half of the 20th
Century. This chronological treatment highlights the gradual change in the FDA’s sophistication towards the
regulation of this new product category. Section III explores the legislative history surrounding the passage of
the Safe Medical Devices Act (SMDA) of 1990, and the provision that led to numerous changes in the way the
4See supra n.1.
5Oﬃce of Combination Products Annual Report to Congress (October 26, 2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/Congressreport.pdf (last visited April 16, 2004).
6See 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.7, 5.7 (2004).
7Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321 et seq. (1938).
5FDA regulates thousands of products each year. Section IV explains the contribution of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997 to the regulation of combination products. Section V
describes the latest and most dramatic changes accompanying the regulation of combination products: the
Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA) of 2002. From this Act, the OCP was born.
Section VI examines the current status of the OCP and Section VII concludes the analysis.
I. Basic Deﬁnitions and Regulatory Procedures for Drugs, Medical Devices, and Biologics
The FDCA was ﬁrst enacted in 1938 as a measure to protect the health and safety of the American public
through the uniform federal regulation of food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics. The FDA, while
existing in a variety of forms and under diﬀerent monikers within multiple federal departments since 18628,
was statutorily recognized in 1988.9 Now a division of the Department of Health and Human Services,
the FDA is responsible for executing and enforcing the FDCA10 and portions of the Public Health Service
Act.11 Most drugs (for human or animal use), medical devices, and biological products introduced into
American interstate commerce must ﬁrst survive a lengthy approval process overseen by the FDA.12 Any
food, drug, medical device, cosmetic or biological product that is adulterated or misbranded potentially
subjects the manufacturer, shipper, and seller of that product to a variety of civil and criminal penalties.13
8See Peter Barton Hutt, A Historical Introduction, 45 FDC L.J. 17 (1990).
9102 Stat. 3048, 3120-22 (1988).
1021 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1) (2004).
11Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2004).
1221 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360b, 360e (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2004).
13See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342-43, 351-52, 361-62 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2004). Violations of the FDCA and the accompanying
penalties are codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-37 (2004).
6The choice of the FDA to prosecute a violation of the FDCA is usually reviewed only to ensure that the
choice was not “arbitrary or capricious,”14 and the selective nonenforcement of the FDCA by the FDA is
nearly unreviewable.15
I. A. Drugs
Pursuant to the FDCA, a “drug” is any article, or component thereof, “intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man” or “intended to aﬀect the structure or any
function of the body of man.”16 Drugs were originally deﬁned in 1938 to exclude devices, but the Safe
Medical Devices Act of 1990 (SMDA) eliminated that exclusion.17 Other than the single amendment in
1990, the deﬁnition of a “drug” has remained the same since 1938.
The regulation of premarket approval and postmarket surveillance of FDA-approved drugs rests with the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).18 A portion of the FDA staﬀ has been devoted to
studying and approving new drugs since the enactment of the FDCA in 1938.19 The current form of CDER,
however, is the result of multiple institutional changes within the FDA. The Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research (CBER) was transferred from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to the FDA in 1972
14See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004).
15See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
1621 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1)(B)-(C), (g)(2) (1938).
1721 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), amended by Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, sec. 16(b)(1), 104 Stat. 4511
(November 28, 1990); see infra Section I.B.
18See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314 et seq., 21 C.F.R. § 5.701(a)(3) (2004).
19See Donna Hamilton, Brief History of CDER, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/history/Histext.htm (last visited April
16, 2004).
7while it still bore the name of the Bureau of Biologics.20 At this time, CDER was actually titled the Bureau
of Drugs. In 1982, the two Bureaus were united within the FDA to form the National Center for Drugs
and Biologics, later renamed the Center for Drugs and Biologics.21 Their union was formal, not functional.
The union, moreover, was temporary; the two groups were divided in 1988 when the Center for Drugs and
Biologics was split into CDER and CBER.22 CBER now oversees the premarket approval of biologics, as
discussed infra at Section I.C. CDER is the largest Center within the FDA, boasting over one thousand
employees, eleven major Oﬃces and seven subsidiary Divisions.23 Just recently, CBER and CDER partially
reunited once again. The latest division of CBER’s jurisdiction was ﬁnalized in late 2004 into a CBER-
only review regime and a review regime under CDER. CDER now bears the responsibility for the review of
therapeutic biologics (excepting cell and gene therapy products and therapeutic vaccines) that traditionally
were reviewed only by CBER.24
Currently, the role of CDER is divided among four major activities: new drug development and review,
generic drug review, over-the-counter drug review, and post drug approval activities.25 The approval of a
new drug is the most scientiﬁcally rigorous, time-consuming and expensive process that CDER, and the
FDA, undertakes. A drug manufacturer, or sponsor, who wishes to have a new drug marketed within the
United States, must ﬁle an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) with CDER.26 The IND contains
animal pharmacology and toxicology data that (hopefully) demonstrates that the drug will be initially safe
20See peter barton hutt & richard a. merrill, food and drug law 664 (2d ed. Foundation Press 1991) (hereinafter
“hutt & merrill”).
21Id.
22Id. See supra n.19. See also 53 Fed. Reg. 8978 (March 18, 1988).
23See supra n.19; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, CDER Oﬃces and Divisions
Page, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/office.htm (last visited April 16, 2004).
2468 Fed. Reg. 38067, 38068 (June 26, 2003). See also CBER Transfer of Therapeutic Products to CDER, at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/transfer/transfer.htm (last visited April 16, 2004). See, e.g. CBER Annual Report FY 2003,
at http://www.fda.gov/cber/inside/annrpt.htm (last visited February 3, 2005).
25CDER Handbook, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook (last visited April 16, 2004).
26Id.; Investigational New Drug Application, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/index.htm (last visited April 16, 2004).
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.1 et seq.
8in humans, and proposed clinical trial and manufacturing information. If CDER approves the IND, the
sponsor may proceed with clinical trials using humans and ship the drug in interstate commerce as part
of those clinical trials.27 At the close of the clinical trials, the sponsor may ﬁle a New Drug Application
(NDA) with CDER.28 The sponsor must show, through clinical data resulting from two human trials, that
the drug is both safe and eﬀective for human use.29 In addition, the sponsor must now contribute a user
fee to accompany the NDA and any later application supplements in exchange for CDER’s review of the
NDA.30
The sponsor of a new generic, or “me-too”31 version, of a “pioneer” drug that already has premarket approval
from CDER does not need to ﬁle a full NDA. Rather, those “me-too” drugs are permitted to pursue an
abbreviated NDA approval (ANDA)32 once the patent and period of market exclusivity for the “pioneer”
drug has expired.33 Approval of an ANDA prior to marketing of the “me-too” drug simply requires evidence
of the drug’s bioequivalence to the “pioneer” drug.34 Once a drug has been approved by CDER, ongoing
postmarket surveillance of the drug takes place, with input from the medical profession, the pharmaceutical
industry, the World Health Organization, other federal agencies (both foreign and domestic), and cooperative
agreements with drug safety evaluation databases.35
27Id.
28See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938); see also Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (October 10, 1962).
2921 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2004); 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)-(e); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50, 34 Fed. Reg. 14596 (September 19, 1969).
3021 U.S.C. § 379j(a) (2004); FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, sec. 103 (November 21,
1997).
31See hutt & merrill at 478.
3221 U.S.C. § 355(j).
33Id. at § 355(j(2)(A)(vii).
34Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
35Drug Experience/Epidemiologic Sources Available to FDA (for Post-Marketing Surveillance and Risk Assessment), at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/index.htm (last visited April 16, 2004).
9I. B. Medical Devices
Medical devices were also subject to the original FDCA as it was enacted in 1938. A “device” included
“instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components,
parts, and accessories, intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, miti-
gation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or
(2) to aﬀect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals.”36
In 1976, Congress amended the FDCA through the passage of the Medical Device Amendments.37 The
deﬁnition of a “device” was altered in part to reﬂect the increasing sophistication that the FDA witnessed
in the design and capability of proposed medical devices. A “device” was more broadly deﬁned to include
an “implement,” “machine,” “implant,” “in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article.”38 More
importantly, the broadened deﬁnition of a “device” modiﬁed the language “intended to aﬀect the structure
or any function of the body of man.” To eliminate overlap in the regulation of drugs, biologics, and devices,
Congress used the 1976 Amendments to require that a device “not achieve any of its principal intended
purposes through chemical action within or on the body...” nor be “dependent upon being metabolized for
the achievement of any of its principal intended purposes.”39
Devices were classiﬁed under the 1976 Amendments to belong to one of three classes (I, II, or III), depend-
ing upon the amount of clinical information that existed to reasonably assure the FDA of the safety and
37Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (May 28, 1976) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
3821 U.S.C. §321(h) (2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-295, sec. 3(a)(1)(A), 90 Stat. 539.
39Id. The 1976 Amendments, by eliminating this deﬁnitional overlap, served to overrule the 1969 decision in United States
v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk..., 394 U.S. 784, 793, 797 (1969). That decision deﬁned “drug” within the FDCA to
be much broader than the medical profession would deﬁne it, and then considered a “device” to have a parallel deﬁnition with
only semantic diﬀerences.
10eﬀectiveness of the device.40 Class I devices required neither a standard nor premarket approval because
the general regulatory controls that the FDCA provided suﬃciently guaranteed the device’s safety and ef-
fectiveness.41 A device that required more specialized controls (or “performance standards”42) to exhibit
safety and eﬀectiveness under the FDCA was a Class II device, and those devices that required premarket
approval43 to provide reasonable assurance of their safety and eﬀectiveness were Class III devices.44 Class III
also originally included all devices that were introduced for FDA approval following the 1976 Amendments
(“postenactment devices”) that were not substantially equivalent to “preenactment devices.”45
With the passage of the SMDA in 1990, Congress once again modiﬁed the deﬁnition of a “device.” Rather
than barring a device from achieving “any of its principal” intended purposes through chemical action or
being metabolized by the body, a device is now barred from achieving “its primary” intended purposes
through those enumerated means.46 The SMDA of 1990 also required the FDA to undertake a massive
reclassiﬁcation of currently regulated medical devices.47 Section 515 of the FDCA was amended to require
the FDA’s reconsideration of its classiﬁcation of all preenactment Class III devices and mandated that those
devices be reclassiﬁed as Class I or Class II, unless the FDA could show that the device properly belonged
in Class III.48
4021 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-295, sec. 2, 90 Stat. 539.
41See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(h); hutt & merrill at 745.
42See 21 U.S.C. § 360d.
43See 21 U.S.C. § 360e.
4421 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C).
45See hutt & merrill at 745.
46See infra section II.A., note 102; 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3), amended by Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (hereinafter “SMDA”),
Pub. L. No. 101-629, sec. 16(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4511 (November 28, 1990).
47See hutt & merrill at 750-51.
4821 U.S.C. §§ 360c(e)-(f), 360e(i) (2004), amended by SMDA, Pub. L. No. 101-629, sec. 4(b), sec. 5, 104 Stat. 4511.
11Currently, the regulation of medical devices in the United States rests with the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health (CDRH) within the FDA.49 Class I devices do not require premarket approval (PMA)
nor do most Class I devices require any premarket notiﬁcation (PMN).50 Most Class II devices, however,
do require a PMN, often known through its statutory shorthand as a “510(k)” because the PMN provisions
are codiﬁed within section 510(k) of the FDCA.51 A 510(k) must be ﬁled with and cleared by the CDRH
prior to marketing of the device in the United States. The 510(k) must demonstrate that the device seeking
FDA approval is either “substantially equivalent”52 to a device that has received premarket approval prior
to the enactment of the 1976 Amendments, or to another device that the CDRH has already determined to
be substantially equivalent.
A device that requires a PMA is a Class III device that poses a signiﬁcant injury or illness risk, or a Class
III device that was not substantially equivalent to a Class I or Class II device already approved under the
510(k) process.53 Although a PMA is not as time-consuming or as expensive as an NDA for a new drug, the
PMA is more diﬃcult to obtain than a PMN and represents an actual approval by the CDRH.54 Single-use
Class III devices may also now be reprocessed and marketed in the United States, but the manufacturer
must prepare ﬁrst a premarket report (PMR) for submission to the FDA. The PMR is similar to a PMA,
but it does not require the inclusion of information that explains how the device was originally manufactured
or processed.55 An unapproved medical device may be used in clinical trials on human subjects pursuant to
4921 C.F.R. § 5.701(a)(2) (2004). See Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice, Overview of Regulations,
at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/overview.html (last visited January 24, 2004).
50A list of Class I and II devices that are exempt from a PMN can be found at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (last visited January 24, 2004).
5121 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2004).
5221 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 807(e) (2004); see supra note 48.
53See supra n.48; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C(ii)(II), 360e(a)-(b) (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2004).
54Id.
5521 U.S.C. § 379i(2) (2004), amended by MDUFMA, Pub. L. No. 107-250, sec. 102(a), 116 Stat. 1588 (October 26, 2002);
see 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(c)(1)-(2)(A) (2004), amended by MDUFMA, sec. 302(c)(2)(B).
12an investigational device exemption (IDE). The proposed clinical trials must be ﬁrst approved, however, by
CDRH and an institutional review board (IRB).56
For both a PMN and a PMA (and some PMA supplements), the device manufacturer must also submit a
user fee in exchange for CDRH’s review of the application.57 Currently, the fee to ﬁle a PMA is roughly one
hundred times greater than the fee that accompanies the ﬁling of a PMN.58 Between 1976 and 1991, more
than 98 percent of new medical devices sought a PMN through substantial equivalence with a preenactment
device.59 The CDRH also performs varying levels of postmarket surveillance, ranging from mandatory
surveillance of certain life-sustaining devices to discretionary surveillance of devices when it is necessary to
protect the public health.60
I. C. Biological Products
The federal Biologics Act, as originally passed in 1902, prohibited the interstate commercial sale or production
of
“any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood
component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or ar-
sphenamine or its derivatives (or any other trivalent organic arsenic com-
pound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of disease or in-
juries of man...”61
56See supra n.48; 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 812 (2004).
5721 U.S.C. § 379(j) (2004), amended by MDUFMA, Pub. L. No. 107-250, sec. 738, 116 Stat. 1588 (October 26, 2002).
58See Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice, PMA Review Fees, at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/userfees.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
59See hutt & merrill at 752.
6021 U.S.C. §§ 360l(a)(1)-(2) (2004); see Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Postmarket Surveillance Studies, at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/352.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
13This language was recodiﬁed within section 351 of the Public Health Services Act (PHSA) in 1944.62 In 1972,
enforcement of the PHSA was delegated to the FDA63 and in 1997, the FDA Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA) codiﬁed this language, with minor changes, to deﬁne a “biological product.”64 One important
distinction between biological products and drugs is that biological products are derived from living sources,
whereas drugs are chemically synthesized.65 At the same time, many biological products can also be classiﬁed
as a “drug” under section 321(g)(1) of the FDCA and thus, the authority of the FDA to regulate biological
products comes from two statutory sources.66
As indicated above in section I.A., the approval and marketing of biological products (excepting therapeutic
biologics, which have been transferred to the jurisdiction of CDER) in the United States is regulated by the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).67 An investigational new drug application (IND) may
be sought and obtained for a biological product as well as for a drug.68 A new biological product, however,
may be marketed within the United States only after CBER approves the manufacturer’s biologics license
application (BLA). The approval of the BLA is conditioned upon demonstration of the safety, purity and
potency of the new biological product.69 This single BLA procedure replaced the old regime of licensing for
biological products in 1999, when the requirement that the manufacturer obtain both an establishment license
application (ELA) and a product license application (PLA) was eliminated.70 Review of a BLA by CBER
6242 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1944).
6321 C.F.R. § 5.10 (2004); 37 Fed. Reg. 12865 (June 29, 1972).
6442 U.S.C. § 262(i) (1997), amended by Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (hereinafter “FDAMA”),
Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 123(d), 111 Stat. 2296 (November 21, 1997).
65See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, at http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm (last visited April 16, 2004).
66Id.
67See 53 Fed. Reg. 8978 (March 18, 1988); 21 C.F.R. § 5.701(a)(1) (2004).
6821 C.F.R. § 312.2(a) (2004).
6921 C.F.R. § 601.2(d) (2004).
7042 U.S.C. §§ 262(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 123(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2296; 64 Fed. Reg.
56441 (October 20, 1999).
14is analogous to the review that CDER undertakes with each NDA. In fact, when Congress enacted FDAMA
in 1997, it charged the FDA with the task of minimizing the diﬀerences in the review and the approval of
NDAs and BLAs.71 Finally, postmarket reporting by the manufacturer of any adverse experiences with the
biological product is required.72
II. 1938-1990: The Changing Landscape of FDA-Regulated Products
As enacted, neither the original FDCA of 1938 nor the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 contemplated
the regulation by the FDA of a product that was not solely a drug, a device, or a biological product, but
was a combination of two or more of those categories. This result is perhaps not surprising in light of the
prevalent technology when the original FDCA was enacted. The regulation of medical devices was added
to the FDCA in 1938 not because of the technological advances in the ﬁeld, but in large part to deter the
marketing of fraudulent devices that increasingly occurred during the 1930s.73 Further, the original FDCA
did not provide for the regulation of biological products.74 Moreover, the FDCA of 1938 expressly deﬁned
a “drug” and a “device” as exclusive of one another. It was not until the passage of the SMDA in 1990
that these two regulated categories were statutorily deﬁned to be nonexclusive.75 One decade after the
enactment of the FDCA, however, technological innovation on the heels of World War II resulted in a near
doubling of the number of domestic medical device manufacturers and a near quadrupling in the total value of
71Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 123(f), 111 Stat. 2296, 2324 (November 21, 1997).
7221 C.F.R. § 600.80(c) (2004).
73See hutt & merrill at 720; S. Rep. No. 94-33, at 2-5 (1975). See also supra, n.11. Biologics are still deﬁned under the
Public Health Service Act, the administration of which was delegated to the FDA in 1972.
74See supra, n.61.
75See supra, n.17.
15domestic industry shipments.76 Especially during the 1960’s, the medical device industry blossomed with the
development of the pacemaker, kidney dialysis systems, and artiﬁcial cardiac valves and blood vessels.77 Yet
updated regulation over these increasingly sophisticated devices that often involved implantation in patients
or accompanying medication regimens remained nonexistent, as the FDA had to furlough stricter regulation
of medical devices in a legislative concession to ensure the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments.78
Once the 1976 Medical Device Amendments were passed, there was still no mention of, or provision for,
a scheme of regulation to control the approval of products that ﬁt into more than one regulated category.
Perhaps this is so for two reasons. The FDA had only recently been delegated the responsibility of regulating
biological products.79 Second, the 1976 Amendments were narrowly focused upon modernizing the FDCA
by broadening its regulatory reach suﬃciently to respond to the medical devices that resulted from the
technological boom.80 Hence there was the creation of the device classes and the corresponding approval
procedures for each class. Despite the continued lack of explicit statutory guidance, the FDA forged ahead.
Through numerous case-by-case decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the FDA assigned or adjusted to the three
main Centers approval jurisdiction over those products occupying the border between drugs, devices, and
biological products. A few examples illustrate the diversity of the situations that the FDA encountered.
In the early 1970’s, the ﬁrst sign of combination products appeared on the FDA’s regulatory landscape.
Products such as radiobiologicals, radiopharmaceuticals, and in vitro diagnostic products explicitly required
76See Theodore H. Cooper, Device Legislation, 26 FDC L. J. 165 (1971)(from 1937 to 1947, the number of American medical
device manufacturers increased from 463 to 980 and the total value of medical device shipments within the United States
increased from a little over one million dollars to $3.72 million annually).
77S. Rep. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975).
78See hutt & merrill at 743.
79See supra, n.63.
80See Cooper, supra, n.76 (nearly 1500 medical device manufacturers, with total annual shipments in excess of $1.5 billion,
in 1967).
16the FDA to determine in which Center each of those products would be regulated.81 Pursuant to the passage
of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments, certain “transitional” devices that the FDA had traditionally
regulated as drugs were redesignated automatically as Class III devices, requiring an approved PMA to enter
the market.82 In 1979, the Bureau of Biologics (a predecessor of CBER) was assigned the lead jurisdiction
for the regulation of medical devices that processed or administered biological products.83 The predecessor
of CDRH, the Bureau of Medical Devices, initially received lead jurisdiction to regulate in vitro biological
diagnostic products in 1980.84 The FDA decided that it could not regulate attached cigarette ﬁlters as
medical devices in 1982.85 In 1986, analytical products that were used to test for a certain chemical allergy
in humans were designated as biological products.86 By 1989, the FDA’s regulatory practices had established
a trend that treated combination products that consisted of a medical device and a drug as a device only,
as long as the drug was employed according to the use that was approved by the FDA.87 In 1990, in vitro
diagnostic products that detected antibodies to hepatitis B core antigens were switched from regulation
as medical devices to regulation as biological products because they began to be used primarily to screen
blood transfusions.88 In contrast, an in vitro radioimmunoassay test that detected the abuse of certain
drugs through human hair analysis was designated as a medical device, requiring a PMA.89 To this day, any
application that is made by a drug manufacturer to the FDA for a new drug that also contains biological
components must be addressed to CBER, rather than CDER.90
8156 Fed. Reg. 58754-01, 1991 WL 242348 (November 21, 1991).
82See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(l) (2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-295, sec. 520, 90 Stat. 539 (May 28, 1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 63472
(December 16, 1977) (listing transitional devices).
83See 44 Fed. Reg. 24236 (April 24, 1979), 47 Fed. Reg. 15412-01 (April 9, 1982).
84See 45 Fed. Reg. 51226 (August 1, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 58964-02 (September 5, 1980), 47 Fed. Reg. 34532-01 (August 10,
1982), 51 Fed. Reg. 37976-03 (October 27, 1986). But see infra Section III.D.3.
85See 47 Fed. Reg. 31130, 31132 (July 16, 1982).
86See 51 Fed. Reg. 33664-01 (September 22, 1986).
87See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 876.5820 (2004)(regulation of hemodialysis system and accessories).
88See 55 Fed. Reg. 5892-02 (February 20, 1990).
89See 55 Fed. Reg. 23985-01 (June 13, 1990).
90See 21 C.F.R. § 312.140; 21 C.F.R. § 312.440 (2004).
17Faced with a product market that was increasingly diverse and sophisticated, as well as an ad hoc regime
of assigning responsibility for those products, each of the three Centers entered into Intercenter Agreements
with each of the other Centers, beginning in 1982. The agreements were designed to minimize repetitive
and conﬂicting regulation, to inform manufacturers, and to conserve agency resources.91 All three of these
agreements ﬁrst determined which Center would have approval jurisdiction for a given type of product and
then provided guidance to the product manufacturer as to the working relationship between each Center
during the approval process.
Coordination between the Bureau of Biologics (BoB), the Bureau of Medical Devices (BMD), and the
Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) was the ﬁrst cooperative agreement to exist when the three bureaus
signed an agreement in 1982 to identify separate responsibilities in the oversight of medical devices.92 The
agreement was still in eﬀect, even after BMD and BRH ﬁrst united in March, 1982 to form CDRH and
BoB eventually became CBER.93 The agreement that arose between CDER and CBER did not predate this
CBER-CDRH agreement because CDER and CBER did not separate from one another again until 1988.94
Their agreement, however, represented simply a continuation of an existing working relationship to regulate
the frontier between drugs and biological products.95 Finally, the agreement between CDER and CDRH was
the formal culmination of multiple, previous ad hoc collaborations (a few examples of which were illustrated
91U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Oﬃce of Combination Products, Intercenter Agreements, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/intercenter.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
92See 47 Fed. Reg. 15412-01 (April 9, 1982).
93Id.; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Oﬃce of Combination Products, Intercenter Agreements, Biologics & Devices
Intercenter Agreement, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ombudsman/bio-dev.htm (last visited April 16, 2004) (hereinafter “CBER-
CDRH Intercenter Agreement”).
94See supra, n.22.
95U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Oﬃce of Combination Products, Intercenter Agreements, Intercenter Agreement
between CDER and CBER, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ombudsman/drug-bio.htm (last visited April 16, 2004) (hereinafter
“CDER-CBER Intercenter Agreement”).
18above).96 It became eﬀective in late October, 1991, as did the latest version of the other two agreements,
because changes were necessary to reﬂect the mandatory provisions of the SMDA.97 The working relationship
between each Center will be explored in more detail infra.
By 1990, the number of sophisticated new products that sought FDA approval and that also potentially
implicated the expertise of more than one Center continued to increase. An extensive Congressional hearing
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
occurred early in 1990 to address the failure of the Bjork-Shiley Convexo-Concave heart valves, previously
approved by CDRH and the FDA.98 During that hearing, a report was introduced by CDRH highlighting
some of the devices that had recently received approval. This report served as an indication of the level of
complexity that CDRH experienced in regulating devices that interacted with the human body. A few of
the examples included anesthesia machines that delivered certain anesthetic gases and oxygen to humans
in patient-speciﬁc dosages,99 hemodialysis machines that intravenously ﬁltered wastes from the blood of a
patient (who was often totally dependent upon that machine for survival)100 and home use in vitro diagnostic
(IVD) devices that screened for medical conditions such as pregnancy, blood glucose, urinary tract infections,
and gonorrhea.101 The CDRH report at the Shiley heart valve hearing made clear that the FDA needed a
more sophisticated statutory grant to acknowledge the changing horizon of its approval landscape.
96U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Oﬃce of Combination Products, Intercenter Agreements, Intercenter Agreement
between CDER and CDRH, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ombudsman/drug-dev.htm (last visited April 16, 2004) (hereinafter
“CDER-CDRH Intercenter Agreement”).
9756 Fed. Reg. 58760-01 (November 21, 1991).
98FDA and the Medical Device Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 203 (1990).
99Id. at 242-43.
100Id. at 259-60.
101Id. at 261-62.
19III. The Safe Medical Devices Act (SMDA) of 1990: Its Origins and Its Impact
III.A. Section 16 of the SMDA
The Shiley heart valve hearing took place just nine months before the passage of the SMDA of 1990. In
the intervening months, both Houses of Congress worked independently on bills meant to modernize the
regulation of medical devices by amending the provisions of the FDCA. The result was the SMDA. Within
the SMDA, a provision appeared that ﬁnally and formally recognized the presence of the combination product
on the FDA’s regulatory radar. Congress for the ﬁrst time codiﬁed how FDA was to exercise its jurisdiction
over a product that was not solely a drug, a medical device, or a biological product within section 353(f) of
the FDCA. The Secretary of Health and Human Services was delegated the power to “designate a component
of the Food and Drug Administration to regulate products that constitute a combination of a drug, device,
or biological product.”102 (emphasis added). Some explanation of the drafting of this pertinent provision and
its inclusion within the SMDA may illustrate how slowly both our administrative and legislative mechanism
responded to the onslaught of combination products.
During August 1990, Senator Edward Kennedy, as the Chair of the Labor and Human Resources Committee,
joined by four other Senators introduced a Senate bill entitled the “Comprehensive Medical Device Improve-
ment Act” (S. 3006).103 As the title of the bill made clear, one purpose of this legislation was to build upon
10221 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (2004).
103Comprehensive Medical Device Improvement Act, S. Res. 3006, 101st Cong. (1990). See 135 Cong. Rec. S12476-02,
S12487 (August 4, 1990).
20the improvements to the FDCA made through the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 by allowing the
medical device industry to “beneﬁt from more consistent FDA regulation” while “encourag[ing] technologi-
cal innovation” and “providing improved protections for public health.”104 One further purpose of S. 3006,
as pointed out by Senator Kennedy, was to “improve eﬃciency in the FDA review process by providing that
the Secretary will require only one market clearance route for products which are combinations of devices,
drugs, or biologics.”105 Senator Dodd echoed Senator Kennedy’s sentiments and added that the “tremendous
diversity in the medical devices industry” made this bill necessary. More particularly, he noted that this
diversity had stood in the way of the FDA’s eﬀective implementation of the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 because of the complexities of those Amendments, the FDA’s interpretation of the Amendments, and
the FDA’s limited resources.106 One other sponsor, Senator Durenberger from Minnesota, supported the
new provisions related to combination product regulation because his constituency was comprised in part of
medical device companies.107 To that end, section 20 of S. 3006 was drafted to amend section 503 of the
FDCA with the following language:
SEC. 20. REVIEW OF MARKET APPLICATIONS FOR ARTICLES
COMPRISING COMBINATIONS OF DRUGS, DEVICES OR BIOLOG-
ICS
Section 503 (21 U.S.C. 353) is amended-
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the following:
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR CERTAIN DRUGS, DEVICES,
AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS;
104Id. at S12487-89.
105Id. at S12489.
106Id.
107Id. at S12495.
21and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f)(1) The Secretary shall require only one market clearance route for an
article that constitutes a combination of a device, drug, or biological prod-
uct. If the Secretary determines that the primary mode of action of the
combination article is that of-
(A) a drug (other than a biological product), neither the combination arti-
cle nor any part of the article shall be treated as a device or as a biological
product for market clearance purposes;
(B) a device, neither the combination article nor any part of the article
shall be treated as a drug or a biological product for market clearance pur-
poses; or
(C) a biological product, neither the combination article nor any part of the
article shall be treated as a drug or a device for market clearance purposes.
(2) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the Secretary from using any
agency resource of the Food and Drug Administration necessary to assure
adequate review of the safety, eﬀectiveness, or substantial equivalence of an
article, if the Secretary employs a single market clearance mechanism.
(3) The Secretary shall promulgate regulations to implement market ap-
proval procedures in accordance with paragraph (1) not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this subsection.
(4) As used in this subsection:
(A) The term ’biological product’ has the meaning given the term in section
351(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(a)).
(B) The term ’market clearance’ includes approval of an application under
section 505, 507, 515, or 520(g), an order determining substantial equiv-
alence under this subchapter, and approval of a product or establishment
license under subsection (a) or (d) of section 351 of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act (42 U.S.C. 262).108 (emphasis added).
Just over two months later, on October 5, 1990, the Committee on Energy and Commerce within the House
of Representatives presented its report on a House bill (H.R. 3095), otherwise known as the Safe Medical
Devices Act of 1990.109 This report was presented to the House just one month before the passage of the
SMDA by Congress, containing the major provisions that would eventually be codiﬁed within the FDCA.
Yet no provision within H.R. 3095 mentioned combination products in any way.
109H.R. 3095, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted). See H. Rep. No. 101-808, 1990 WL 200530 (October 5, 1990).
22Four days later, the Senate was presented with a report from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources
recommending passage of an amended version of S. 3006.110 The pertinent language from the amended
section 20 of S. 3006 is reprinted below, so as to be contrasted with the earlier version reproduced in italics
supra.
SEC. 20. REVIEW OF MARKET APPLICATIONS FOR ARTICLES
COMPRISING COMBINATIONS OF DRUGS, DEVICES, AND BIO-
LOGICS.
Section 503 (21 U.S.C. 353) is amended-
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the following:
EXEMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATION FOR CERTAIN DRUGS,
DEVICES, AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS;
110S. Rep. No. 101-513, 1990 WL 201762 (October 9, 1990).
23and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f)(1) The Secretary shall designate a component of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration to regulate products that constitute a combination of a drug,
device, or biological product. The Secretary shall determine the primary
mode of action of the combination product. If the Secretary determines
that the primary mode of action is that of-
(A) a drug (other than a biological product), the persons charged with pre-
market review of drugs shall have primary jurisdiction;
(B) a device, the persons charged with premarket review of devices shall
have primary jurisdiction; or
(C) a biological product, the persons charged with premarket review of bi-
ological products shall have primary jurisdiction.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Secretary from using any
agency resources of the Food and Drug Administration necessary to ensure
adequate review of the safety, eﬀectiveness, or substantial equivalence of
an article. (3) The Secretary shall promulgate regulations to implement
market approval procedures in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) not
later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this subsection.
(4) As used in this subsection:
(A) The term ’biological product’ has the meaning given the term in section
351(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(a)).
(B) The term ’market clearance’ includes-
(i) approval of an application under section 505, 507, 515, or 520(g);
(ii) a ﬁnding of substantial equivalence under this subchapter; and
(iii) approval of a product or establishment license under subsection (a) or
(d) of section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262).111
This amendment to S. 3006 contains the ﬁnal version of the provision that explicitly governs the FDA’s pre-
existing regulatory control over combination products, as it also appeared within section 16 of the SMDA and
as it was codiﬁed within section 503 of the FDCA.112 The most obvious and noteworthy diﬀerence between
the two versions was the removal of the earlier language “requir[ing] one market clearance route” in favor of a
more broad designation directing the FDA to “regulate products that constitute a combination.” In addition,
the earlier version required that once the FDA determined the primary mode of action of the product, that
primary mode would guide the product’s approval process to such an extent that “neither the combination
112SMDA, Pub. L. No. 101-629, sec. 16(a), 21 U.S.C. § 353(f) (1990).
24article nor any part of the article” would be treated as anything other than pertaining to that primary
mode for market clearance purposes.113 As the later version of section 20 makes clear, the Senate eased
those restrictions by granting “primary jurisdiction” to the Center that normally oversees products with
that primary mode of action.114 That Center would be responsible for reviewing the premarket submission
of the entire combination product.115 Such language allows for the cooperative input of the other Centers
during the approval process.
The report that accompanied the amended version of S. 3006 echoed Senator Kennedy’s statements two
months earlier with regard to lessening product over-regulation by the FDA while maintaining an innovative
medical device industry. Yet the report went further than the previous comments on the Senate ﬂoor as it
explained the intent behind adding section 20 to regulate combination products. The Labor and Human
Resources Committee recognized the “diﬃculty under the present law in determining the jurisdictional base
for regulating products that are comprised of combinations of drugs, devices, or biologics,” and made note
of the industry view that the FDA’s premarket review process was weak in determining how to regulate
combination products.116 The delays that combination product manufacturers felt due to this regulatory
weakness spurred the Senate to “provide the Secretary with ﬁrm ground rules to direct products promptly
to that part of the FDA responsible for reviewing the article that provides the primary mode of action,”
especially since the number of combination products coming before the FDA for approval was increasing.117
Section 20 was drafted to “eliminate the need to receive clearances from both the device and drug review
113See supra n.108.
114See supra n.111.
115S. Rep. No. 101-513, VI. Section-By-Section Analysis, Section 20, 1990 WL 201762 (October 9, 1990).
116Id. at IV. Committee Views, Sections 19 and 20.
117Id.
25divisions, and will vest authority in one agency group to conduct a premarket review.”118 The Committee
was quick to caution, however, that the goal of administrative eﬃciency within the FDA would not exempt
the manufacturer from producing the same level of safety and eﬀectiveness data for each component of the
combination product.119
Just over two weeks later, Representative Waxman submitted a conference report to the House of Represen-
tatives.120 The report was the result of a conference that was necessary to resolve the diﬀerences between
H.R. 3095 and S. 3006. The Senate, when presented with H.R. 3095, had replaced all of the provisions with
the text of S. 3006; the House had responded by amending S. 3006 and replacing some of the language of
H.R. 3095 again.121 The conference version of H.R. 3095 that resulted was an amalgamation of the two bills,
and it was the ﬁnal bill that would be passed by both Houses,122 presented to the President, and enacted
at the close of 1990 as the SMDA. With respect to combination products, this conference report is of note
because the conference managers from both Houses agreed to the inclusion of section 20 of S. 3006 within
the ﬁnal bill.123
In the aftermath of the passage of the SMDA, the deﬁnition of a medical device itself had to be altered because
section 16 of the SMDA, formerly section 20 of S. 3006, provided for combination product regulation by a
118Id.
119Id.
120H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-959 (1990). See 136 Cong. Rec. H13251-01, 1990 WL 290412 (October 26, 1990).
121Id. at H13256.
122See 136 Cong. Rec. H13008-01 (October 26, 1990) (House acceptance of the conference report); see 136 Cong. Rec.
S17456-01, S17458 (October 27, 1990) (Senate acceptance of the conference report). Sen. Durenberger in particular expressed
his gratitude toward the “inclu[sion] of the Senate provision on products which are comprised of combinations of devices, drugs,
or biologics. These so-called combination products are, and will continue to be, of great beneﬁt to health care consumers, and
I think it is important that we acted to streamline the regulatory barriers facing such products.”
123136 Cong. Rec. at H13259.
26speciﬁc Center based upon the product’s “primary mode of action.”124 The primary mode of action of the
product was determined once the product’s eﬀect upon the body and the relative contribution of each of
its components was assessed.125 If the primary mode of action was not determinable in that manner, then
other factors such as guidance from the Intercenter Agreements or a determination of the most innovative
component of the product that posed the greatest safety risk or clearest indication of use would guide the
FDA in deciding to which Center jurisdiction would be granted.126 Once approval and oversight jurisdiction
of each product was thus awarded, Congress needed to redeﬁne a “device” in terms of “its primary” purpose
rather than “any of its principal purposes” to comply. In 1991, Congress amended the FDCA to move
section 16 of the SMDA and its “primary mode of action” language to its current resting place within
section 353(g).127
III.B. The Eﬀect of the SMDA on the FDA’s Regulatory Framework
With the statutory mandate of the SMDA to oversee and approve combination products added to the FDA’s
responsibilities, the FDA next undertook administrative proceedings to adapt its regulatory framework by
November 29, 1991, the one-year deadline set by the SMDA.128 Such an adaptation would give each Center
and each product manufacturer guidelines to adhere to throughout the approval process. On November 21,
1991, the FDA announced ﬁnal regulations containing the new provisions in 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.10 (1991) “to
describe how the agency will determine which component within FDA will have primary jurisdiction for the
124Pub. L. No. 101-629, sec. 16(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4511; 56 Fed. Reg. 58754 (November 21, 1991); 21 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2004).
12521 C.F.R. § 3.4(a) (2004); 56 Fed. Reg. 58754 (November 21, 1991); 67 Fed. Reg. 34722 (May 15, 2002).
12621 C.F.R. § 3.5; see 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.7(a)-(b) (2004).
127Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Amendment, Pub. L. No. 102-108, sec. 2(d)(4), § 353(g), 105 Stat. 549,
550 (August 17, 1991).
12856 Fed. Reg. 58754-01, 1991 WL 242348 (November 21, 1991).
27premarket review and regulation of: (1) A combination drug, device, or biologic product or (2) any drug,
device, or biologic product where the center with primary jurisdiction is unclear or in dispute. This rule
describes how to identify the agency’s assigned review component which will, in most cases, eliminate the
need for a sponsor to obtain approval from more than one FDA component for a combination product.”129
In light of this change in its approval procedures, the FDA decided that its approval eﬃciency would be
enhanced by also applying these new rules in the future to any product whose approval jurisdiction was
disputed or unclear. The rules would not be limited to only those combination products as deﬁned by the
SMDA.130 The FDA explicitly excluded from that regulation, however, most drugs, devices or biological
products that are used concomitantly as well as products that are comprised exclusively of two or more
drugs, two or more devices, or two or more biological products.131
Since these new regulations would bind both the Centers within the FDA and the combination product
manufacturers, the FDA stepped beyond the basic deﬁnition of a combination product as provided by the
SMDA, and used the new regulations to provide a few illustrative examples of how the SMDA deﬁnition
could be interpreted.132 The term “combination product” now encompassed
(1) A product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e.,
drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that
are physically, chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced
as a single entity;
(2) Two or more separate products packaged together in a single package or
as a unit and comprised of drug and device products, device and biological
products, or biological and drug products;
129Id.
13021 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.3 (1991). 56 Fed. Reg. at 58756. See also 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (2004).
131Id. at 58755.
132Id. at 58754-55.
28(3) A drug, device, or biological product packaged separately that according
to its investigational plan or proposed labeling is intended for use only with
an approved individually speciﬁed drug, device, or biological product where
both are required to achieve the intended use, indication, or eﬀect and where
upon approval of the proposed product the labeling of the approved product
would need to be changed, e.g., to reﬂect a change in intended use, dosage
form, strength, route of administration, or signiﬁcant change in dose; or
(4) Any investigational drug, device, or biological product packaged sepa-
rately that according to its proposed labeling is for use only with another in-
dividually speciﬁed investigational drug, device, or biological product where
both are required to achieve the intended use, indication, or eﬀect.133
Paragraph (1) comports as expected with the literal deﬁnition of a combination product as given by the
SMDA. Paragraphs (2) – (4), by contrast, represent the inﬂuence of other industry considerations uniquely
within the purview of FDA’s regulatory knowledge.
One explanation for the inclusion of paragraphs (2) – (4), regulating both products that are packaged
together and products that are packaged separately but labeled in such a manner so as to be used together,
is the inﬂuence of the other administrative responsibilities of the FDA. The SMDA was enacted in part to
ensure the safety and eﬀectiveness of medical devices by modernizing the standards of premarket review
applied to those devices.134 As these regulations stated, though, “nothing in this section [16 of the SMDA]
prevents FDA from using any agency resources it deems necessary to ensure adequate review of the safety
and eﬀectiveness of any product.”135 As mentioned supra, the FDA also monitors the labeling and packaging
of drugs, medical devices, and biological products as part of its administrative role.136 Thus, Congress may
have considered a product to represent a combination only if the parts of the combination were in physical
134See supra n.102.
13521 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1991).
136See supra n.13.
29proximity to one another, given the original language of section 20 of S. 3006 and the ﬁnal codiﬁed language
of section 16 of the SMDA.
But the FDA, through this rule, expressed an understanding that classiﬁcation as a combination product
may extend beyond the immediate appearance of the product (or its parts) to the manner in which the
product is employed by the end consumer. Two items that are packaged separately, but are intended to
be used in conjunction with one another for the beneﬁt of the patient, will be treated as a combination
product by the health professional administering the product. The separate parts, then, are best regulated
as a combination product by the FDA as well to ensure the overall safety of the product and the patient, in
accordance with the statutory charge of the SMDA.
After explaining the purpose of these new regulations in response to the SMDA, providing deﬁnitions to
industry terms appearing within the regulations, and clarifying their scope, the FDA reiterated that the
product’s “primary mode of action” would be the primary determinant in assigning Center premarket re-
view jurisdiction.137 The FDA did make one important addition, however, to the provisions of the SMDA
regarding the primary mode of action. The original language of section 20 of S. 3006 granted approval juris-
diction to only one Center for “market clearance purposes.”138 Yet that language was softened, perhaps in
response to the disagreement by the House in H.R. 3095 and as a concession by the Conference Committee,
such that section 16 of the SMDA gave to the Center responsible for reviewing the product’s primary mode
of action only “primary jurisdiction.” To cement this new statutory position within the FDCA, the FDA
13721 C.F.R. § 3.4 (1991). 56 Fed. Reg. at 58756-57. See also 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (2004).
138See supra III.A., n.108.
30provided that “the designation of one agency component as having primary jurisdiction for the premarket
review and regulation of a combination product does not preclude consultations by that component with other
agency components or, in appropriate cases, the requirement by FDA of separate applications”139 (emphasis
added).
In a corresponding fashion, the three Intercenter Agreements,140 discussed infra in II.C., were updated at
approximately the same time that these regulations were promulgated to reﬂect the changes eﬀected by the
SMDA in favor of greater intercenter cooperation. The FDA drew attention to the existence of these non-
binding documents to inform combination product manufacturers and the public by citing them in the new
regulations.141 Section 3.5(a)(3) of these regulations encouraged the manufacturer to contact the appropriate
Center before beginning the premarket review process to discuss the Center’s jurisdiction and to settle any
questions. This provision evinces the policy that initially motivated the SMDA: greater communication
between the industry manufacturer and the FDA to enhance the eﬃciency of the regulatory process and to
increase the public safety.
The remaining regulations, published in November 1991, elucidated the actual steps to be taken by a product
manufacturer prior to a premarket review.142 Section 3.7 detailed the “who, when, what and where” for
the product manufacturer wishing to ﬁle a letter of request for designation.143 Section 3.8 explained that a
13921 C.F.R. § 3.4(b) (1991). 56 Fed. Reg. at 58756-57.
140See also supra n. 91.
14121 C.F.R. § 3.5 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. at 58757.
14221 C.F.R. §§ 3.7-.10 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. at 58757-58.
14321 C.F.R. § 3.7 (1991). A “letter of request means an applicant’s written submission to the product jurisdiction oﬃcer
seeking the designation of the agency component with primary jurisdiction.” 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(j) (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. at 58756.
31letter of designation would be sent back to the manufacturer within sixty days of the request “specifying the
agency component designated to have primary jurisdiction for the premarket review and regulation of the
product at issue, and any consulting agency components.” 144 The product manufacturer, if unhappy with
the agency’s decision, could request a reconsideration within ﬁfteen days of receiving the letter of designation;
the agency would then be given ﬁfteen additional days to review the designation and respond.145 Finally,
a letter of designation would represent a ﬁnal FDA determination unless the product jurisdiction oﬃcer (in
this case, the FDA Ombudsman146) changed the designation with the manufacturer’s consent or without the
manufacturer’s consent because of concerns about the public health “or other compelling reasons.”147 The
manufacturer would be entitled to object to such a nonconsensual change and the FDA would be required
to respond in writing with reasons for the change.148
III. C. 1991: The New Intercenter Agreements
In response to the statutory and regulatory changes that the SMDA eﬀected within the FDA as a whole,
each Center within the FDA needed to modernize its individual approach toward combination products.
The Intercenter Agreements that resulted late in 1991 thus determined the role of each Center when the
expertise of two or more Centers was involved in the approval of a combination product. Predictably, each
of their traditional roles was maintained. CDRH still maintained lead jurisdiction for approving medical
14421 C.F.R. § 3.8(b) (1991). A “letter of designation means the written notice issued by the product jurisdiction oﬃcer
specifying the agency component with primary jurisdiction for a combination product.” 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(i) (1991); 56 Fed. Reg.
at 58756.
14521 C.F.R. § 3.8(c) (1991).
14621 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. at 58757.
14721 C.F.R. § 3.9 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. at 58757.
14821 C.F.R. § 3.9(b) (1991). As an extra administrative check on a nonconsensual change in designation, the product
jurisdiction oﬃcer’s decision “requires the concurrence of the Deputy Commissioner for Operations or the Deputy Commissioner
for Policy.” Id.
32devices, CDER still oversaw the approval of new drugs, and CBER still regulated the presence of biological
products in the American market. The modernization eﬀorts that were set into motion by the SMDA,
however, could not be fully realized without the cooperation of each of the other Centers. As a result, the
Intercenter Agreements speciﬁed that premarket review of combination products would require the Centers
either to divide their jurisdiction pursuant to the guidelines established by the pertinent Agreement or work
cooperatively to oversee the tailored approval process.
Each Agreement also provided for an Intercenter Jurisdictional Committee, an ad hoc group comprised of
one regular member and one alternate from each Center. The committee would resolve questions that arose
over the manner in which jurisdiction for product approval had been assigned. Any disagreement within
the committee would result in an application of the product jurisdiction procedures. These procedures,
sometimes called the “request for designation” (RFD) process,149 also would be available at the initial
request of the product manufacturer for a formal agency determination of which Center would have approval
jurisdiction.150
III. C. 1. CBER-CDRH Intercenter Agreement
Combination products that were subject to the CBER-CDRH Agreement included those products that
represented advances in medical device technology for biological applications or biological products coupled
149See supra III.B., n.143.
150See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Oﬃce of Combination Products, Jurisdictional Updates, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/updates.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
33with medical devices for therapeutic use.151 CDRH was designated the lead Center to manage any good
manufacturing practices (GMP) problems in addition to all of the medical device reporting issues that arose
as a result of the premarket review process.152 In contrast, both CBER and CDRH would share jurisdiction
over other aspects of the approval process, including surveillance and FDCA compliance, informal and formal
sanctions, PMNs, IDEs, PMAs and petitions for device reclassiﬁcation and exemptions.153
Formal approval responsibility for medical devices, however, was divided between the Centers in the following
ways. CDRH would retain general approval responsibility, but CBER became generally responsible for
regulating “medical devices used or indicated for the collection, processing, storage or administration of blood
products, blood components or analogous products, as well as screening or conﬁrmatory clinical laboratory
tests associated with blood banking practices and other process testing procedures” as well as any in vitro
test kits and any medical devices intended for use for HIV and other retroviruses.154 The Agreement provided
a few examples of these devices, including collection devices, specimen containers, components of test kits
and those devices used for the inactivation of HIV and other retroviruses.155 CBER was also assigned the
approval jurisdiction to regulate some generic medical devices that the CDRH originally classiﬁed in its
hematology category.156 CDRH would regain responsibility, though, if the device had a therapeutic purpose,
meaning that the device was intended for a speciﬁc use on a particular patient with a speciﬁc ailment to
provide a direct clinical beneﬁt for that patient.157
151See CBER-CDRH Intercenter Agreement, supra n.93.
152Id. at section III.
153Id. at section IV.
154Id. at section VI.
155Id.
156Id. at section VII.
157Id. at section VI.
34III.C. 2. CDER-CDRH Intercenter Agreement
These two Centers were accustomed to cooperating prior to their 1991 Agreement,158 but both recognized
that the statutory amendments created the SMDA would require a codiﬁcation of their working relationship
rather than a continuation of their history of ad hoc decision-making.159 To some extent, this Agreement
mirrored the CBER-CDRH agreement, in that CDRH and CDER shared the same subelements of jurisdiction
over the general aspects of the approval process as do CBER and CDRH.160 Similarly, the two Centers in
this Agreement strove to assure manufacturers that approval for their product usually would be necessary
from only one Center.161 To that end, the Agreement provided in some detail the criteria that CDER and
CDRH would consider in designating a product as a drug, device, or a combination thereof before assigning
approval jurisdiction.162
In addition, the Agreement explained how the two Centers would manage the approval of a few important,
common product designs. The category that the product would be placed in (drug, device, or combination
product), the steps of approval (including the appropriate application mechanism) and the subsequent role of
each Center was outlined. First, the Agreement indicated in what special circumstances the approval of both
Centers still would be required, such as when the product was a device that primarily delivered or helped
to deliver a drug, but that drug is not distributed with the device.163 Another example was a device that
158See supra n.93.
159See CDER-CDRH Intercenter Agreement, supra n.96.
160See id. at section IV.
161See id. at section V. See also id. at section VI; CBER-CDRH Intercenter Agreement, supra n.93 at section V. (allowing
for the possibility of a collaborative review between the two Centers, even though the regulations contained within 21 C.F.R.
Part 3 encourage the grant of approval jurisdiction to just one Center).
162Id. at section VIII.
163Id. at section VII.A.1(a).
35was used concurrently with a drug to activate or improve the beneﬁt of the drug.164 Second, the Agreement
maintained a default category in which ad hoc jurisdictional decisions still would be appropriate.165 Products
traditionally considered to be drugs and devices, respectively, would retain that designation, except those
drugs that were aﬀected by the Transitional Device Notice in 1977.166
Finally, the Agreement indicated what types of new products could anticipate being categorized as combi-
nation products and what Center would have subsequent primary jurisdiction over their approval. Medical
devices that were pre-ﬁlled with drugs to deliver, or devices that incorporated the drug in general within the
overall product as part of the functioning of the device, were both examples of combination products, except
that CDER would oversee the former and CDRH would oversee the latter.167 Further examples included a
drug that incorporated a device component to eﬀect the function of the drug (overseen by CDER),168 a drug
and a device combined together that would process the drug into its ﬁnal packaged form (CDER),169 and a
device kit that was both labeled for use with a certain drug and was packaged with that drug as a means of
eﬀectuating the function of the device (CDRH).170 An interesting exception to these standards was a device
that would be used to produce a drug that was delivered directly to the patient or was used at a medical
facility. The product would be classiﬁed a device, yet regulated by CDER.171
III. C. 3. CDER-CBER Intercenter Agreement:
164Id. at section VII.B.1.
165Id. at section VII.E.
166Id. at section VII.C.-D. See also supra, n.82.
167See id. at section VII.A.1(b)-A.2.
168See id. at section VII.A.3.
169See id. at section VII.A.4(b).
170See id. at section VII.B.2.
171See id. at section VII.A.4(a).
36Taking yet another approach than the CDER-CDRH Agreement, CDER and CBER chose to designate
approval jurisdiction for a drug or biological product depending upon the product class.172 A product class
was deﬁned to be a “distinct category of agents recognizable by physical characteristics, source materials or
pharmacologic properties.”173 The Agreement provided a few examples of these classes: vaccines, hormones,
and antibiotics. When one Center was given regulatory responsibility, that Center would oversee both the
manufacture of the product and its resulting quality, but the other Center would not be precluded from
participating in the oversight.174 CDER was given the responsibility of regulating products from nonhuman
animal, solid human tissue sources, chemically synthesized molecules (excluding vaccines or allergenics),
antibiotics, certain fungi and bacteria products, and hormone products.175 CBER, in contrast, would regulate
biological products that were subject to BLAs (such as vaccines, in vivo diagnostic allergenic products, human
blood or immunoglobulin products, proteins, peptide or carbohydrate products), synthetically produced
allergenic products, and certain drugs associated with blood banking.176
For combination products that possessed both drug and biological components, the product would fall under
CDER’s jurisdiction if the biological component “enhanced the eﬃcacy or ameliorated the toxicity” of the
drug component. A reverse result would place the product under CBER’s jurisdiction.177 A combination
product that contained a biological product coupled with either a radioactive component or a toxin compo-
nent (that is not a drug) would be subject to CBER regulation, whereas a biological component that was
172See CDER-CBER Intercenter Agreement, section III, supra n.95.
173Id.
174Id.
175Id. at section III.A.
176Id. at section III.B.
177Id. at section III.D.1.-2.
37used to aﬀect distribution of the product coupled with a nonradioactive drug component would be subject
to CDER regulation.178
One unique aspect of this Agreement was the designation of responsibility for medical reviews and pharma-
cology/toxicology reviews. Products approved by CDER and CBER implicate concerns for human health,
safety, and exposure in a way that medical devices often do not. Thus, approval of the product by either
Center would be conditioned upon the inclusion of an analysis of the product’s eﬀect in the ﬁelds of allergy,
clinical immunology and rheumatology, hematology, oncology and infectious diseases.179 Since multiple clin-
ical subsets of each of those ﬁelds exist, the Agreement enumerated in more detail which Center would have
primary medical review jurisdiction over each subset. Both Centers retained concurrent review jurisdiction
over a third group of products, but the Center that would be assigned overall approval jurisdiction of the
product was also responsible for the product’s medical review.180 If the medical review of a product was
not delegated to the Center with the overall approval jurisdiction for that product (so-called “collaborative
review”181), then both Centers would share the responsibility of completing the pharmacology/toxicology
review.182 If CDER received approval jurisdiction for a product containing human source material, then
CBER would be expected to consult on appropriate tests for unexpected agents within the product.183
“Collaborative review” diﬀered from a more informal consultation in that the Center with collaborative
jurisdiction was bound to produce a deﬁnitive result from its review that would be included in the ﬁnal
administrative record, even if that Center did not have ﬁnal product jurisdiction.184
178Id.
179Id. at section IV.
180See id. at section IV.A.-C.
181See id. at section VI.
182Id. at section V.A.1.
183Id. at section V.B.
184See id. at section VI.
38III.D. The Middle 1990’s: The Continuing Eﬀect of the SMDA
III.D.I. To Move or Not to Move the FDA Centers?
Following the passage of the SMDA and the promulgation of the corresponding regulations by the FDA,
the recognition of combination products as a separate class deserving of separate regulatory procedures by
the FDA took a quantum leap forward. Yet, once this change evolved into a common feature of the FDA’s
approval landscape, a familiar and still unresolved challenge rose once again for CDRH, CBER, and CDER:
how actually to implement the statutory and administrative mandates that were set out for the Centers with
three separate staﬀs that were increasingly inundated with premarket review requests and were physically
separated in diﬀerent FDA buildings.
At a hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development of the House Commit-
tee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Dr. David A. Kessler, informed
the Subcommittee that the FDA was still receiving an increasing number of requests for combination product
premarket review.185 More notably, his appearance before this particular Subcommittee was in conjunction
with the FDA’s campaign to consolidate its operations on two, as yet unapproved, centralized campuses
in Maryland. According to Commissioner Kessler, “the current fragmentation of FDA review staﬀ among
many scattered facilities result[ed] in unnecessary approval delays for these [combination] products.”186 His
support for consolidation of the FDA facilities was motivated in part by the same concerns that Senator
185Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Bldgs. and Econ. Dev. of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 1995
WL 89247 (March 6, 1995) (statement of Dr. David A. Kessler, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration). Commissioner
Kessler also gave examples of some of the more recent applications for combination products, including “drug delivery systems,
medicated wound dressing, bone cement containing an antibiotic, and dental composites with ﬂuoride.”
186Id.
39Kennedy expressed in promoting the SMDA ﬁve years earlier: “improvements in eﬃciencies” and continued
improvement in “the time frames for product approval decisions.”187
The administrative push for these two new FDA campuses, however, met with signiﬁcant resistance from
at least one source. C. Boyden Gray, the Chairman of Citizens for a Sound Economy, a non-proﬁt research
and education organization formed to advocate market-based solutions for public policy problems, testiﬁed
before the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations just two weeks after Commissioner Kessler made his statements in favor of the consolidated
campuses.188 Chairman Gray’s testimony focused upon the proposed expenditures for the two campuses,
one of which would tentatively house CDRH, CBER, and CDER. He expressed skepticism at the FDA’s
insistence that its “dispersed locations... have created both administrative and operations ineﬃciencies.”189
In particular, he criticized the need for inter-Center communication by noting that “the number of products
aﬀected by more than one evaluating center is small compared to the total number of product applications
evaluated by the agency each year. In all likelihood, an $810 million campus will not signiﬁcantly speed up the
approval process for the relatively small number of products that need to be evaluated between centers.”190
Instead, Chairman Gray advocated the continued use of the FDA’s state of the art, inter-agency computer
network that allowed the premarket reviewers to communicate with each other via the World Wide Web.191
187Id.
188Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Serv., and General Gov’t of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
1995 WL 118134 (March 21, 1995) (statement of C. Boyden Gray, Chairman, Citizens for a Sound Economy).
189Id.
190Id.
191See id.
40The legislative record does not disclose an immediate response by the FDA, but the debate over the FDA
campus consolidation continued. Fourteen months after Chairman Gray’s claims that the consolidation of
CBER, CDRH, and CDER into one building would be a waste of government spending, especially after the
General Services Administration (GSA) was appropriated approximately $325 million between 1992 and 1995
for the project,192 FDA Deputy Commissioner for External Aﬀairs Sharon Smith Holston also addressed the
Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic Development of the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure.193 Her response to Chairman Gray was an appeal grounded in the experience of the
FDA in the regulation of these products. She noted that
“[FDA’s] experience demonstrates that the Agency is increasingly required
to resolve policy questions involving multiple FDA Centers, diﬀering or
overlapping statutory jurisdiction, or complex emerging developments in
new science or technology that aﬀect more than one of our Centers. This
emerging trend means that there is a greater need for collaboration across
Center lines, and for sharing resources, including personnel, equipment, and
scientiﬁc expertise.... Consolidation will allow FDA scientists to engage in
collaborative eﬀorts that are critical both to the advancement of knowledge
and to the coordination of research and review functions performed by the
Agency.”194
While Ms. Holston’s comments did not disclose a radical development in FDA regulatory policy, they ar-
guably indicated a frustration within the Agency that had continued unresolved ﬁve years after the passage of
section 16 of the SMDA and four years after the corresponding premarket review regulations were published.
Despite the Congressional eﬀorts through the SMDA to provide for more eﬃcient product regulation to
further the public health, it appeared that the FDA was still struggling to realize the level of administrative
eﬃciency and inter-Center informational collaboration that would need to exist before eﬀective combination
192Id.
193Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Bldgs. and Econ. Dev. of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,
1996 WL 276588 (May 23, 1996) (statement of Sharon Smith Holston, Deputy Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration
External Aﬀairs).
41product regulation could exist. The debate over the physical location of the three Centers only threw that
continuing struggle into relief. Thus, the statutory recognition of combination products and the accompany-
ing adjustments to the FDA’s regulatory framework may have represented more of a quantum leap on paper
than in practice.195
III.D.2. The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1996
Combination products continued to be implicated in unexpected ways throughout 1996, both in the debate
over the FDA campus consolidation, and in the political battle over the legal limits of a medical device
manufacturer’s product liability in litigation. On March 14, 1996, a conference report was published on H.R.
956, the Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996.196 Title II of this Act contained the
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1996 (“BAAA”).197 The BAAA found that the suppliers of the raw
materials and component parts used to make medical devices that are included later within combination
products do not have a duty either to “evaluate the safety and eﬃcacy of the use of a raw material or
component part in a medical device” or to “warn consumers concerning the safety and eﬀectiveness of a
medical device.”198 Yet, to impose such a duty on those suppliers would “cause more harm than good
195After all of the debate surrounding the consolidation of the FDA campuses, construction is currently underway on the White
Oak campus in Montgomery County, Maryland. The consolidated campus is the result of explicit Congressional approval; in
1990, section 101 of the FDA Revitalization Act authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services in conjunction with
the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to begin contracting for a consolidated FDA facility. FDA
Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-635, sec. 101, 104 Stat. 4583, 21 U.S.C. § 379b (November 28, 1990). Through the combined
eﬀorts of the GSA and the FDA, the new White Oak facility will ﬁnally house CBER, CDER, and CDRH in one location.
The facility will provide updated laboratory space in addition to administrative oﬃce space for the FDA’s research scientists
and their support staﬀ. The construction will be completed in yearly phases, with the CDER facilities to be completed ﬁrst in
2007, the CDRH facilities to follow in 2008, and the CBER facilities to be ﬁnished in 2009. FDA Headquarters Consolidation
at White Oak, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/whiteoak/ (last visited April 16, 2004); FDA Headquarters Consolidation at White
Oak Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/whiteoak/faq.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
196H. Rep. No. 104-481, 142 Cong. Rec. H2238-05, 1996 WL 111996 (March 14, 1996).
197Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1996 (“BAAA”), Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.
(August 13, 1998).
198BAAA, § 202(13); 21 U.S.C. § 1601(13) (2004); 142 Cong. Rec. at H2242. Under the BAAA, a “medical device” includes
42by driving the suppliers to cease supplying manufacturers of medical devices.”199 Thus, to “safeguard the
availability of a wide variety of lifesaving and life-enhancing medical devices” and device components of
combination products, Congress determined that “immediate action [was] needed to clarify the permissible
bases of liability for suppliers of raw materials and component parts for medical devices... and... to provide
expeditious procedures to dispose of unwarranted suits against the suppliers in such manner as to minimize
litigation costs.”200 The BAAA thus imposed product liability upon biomaterials suppliers for harm caused
to a person by a medical implant, but only if that supplier was also the manufacturer or the seller of the
implant.201
While Congress sought to provide a legal defense from product liability to suppliers of raw materials or parts
that are included in implantable medical devices, it distinguished the device parts from the other facets of
a combination product, such as an active ingredient or drug.202 By the terms of the BAAA, only the parts
that qualiﬁed as medical devices were allowed to claim the legal defense, and not the parts provided by the
suppliers or manufacturers of the active ingredient or drug. As the report stated, “this will ensure that
the development and availability of such devices will not be impaired because of the same liability concerns
aﬀecting the availability of materials for other types of implants.”203 The BAAA stood as another example
of how the advent of combination products had changed more than just the immediate regulatory landscape
of the FDA. Congress found that a balance needed to be struck between the pressure felt by medical device
“any device component of any combination product as that term is used in section 503(g) of such Act (21 U.S.C. 353(g)).”
BAAA, § 203(7); 142 Cong. Rec. at H2242.
199BAAA, § 203(14); 142 Cong. Rec. at H2242. The BAAA, as enacted, did not employ the exact language of section 203(14).
Rather, a similar provision was codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 1601(8) that found that “even though suppliers of raw materials and
component parts have very rarely been held liable in such actions, such suppliers have ceased supplying certain raw materials
and component parts for use in medical devices for a number of reasons, including concerns about the costs of such litigation.”
200BAAA, § 202(15); 21 U.S.C. § 1601(15); 142 Cong. Rec. at H2242.
201BAAA, §§ 205(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1); 21 U.S.C. §§ 1604(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1); 142 Cong. Rec. at H2243.
202See 142 Cong. Rec. at H2247.
203Id.
43and combination product manufacturers to stay ahead of the technological curve and the safety of patients
receiving those products. All of this legislation could be interpreted as an additional chapter in the pursuit
of the original goal of the SMDA: to enable the ﬁnancial and scientiﬁc growth of the combination product
industry while preserving as preeminent the safety of the American public.
III.D.3. Up in Smoke: Combination Products and the Supreme Court
Before 1996 drew to a close, the FDA undoubtedly classiﬁed multiple new products as combination products.
But one classiﬁcation in particular, directed at a politically and culturally charged product, would become
a fateful administrative decision. Never before had the FDA chosen to regulate tobacco products, but on
August 28, 1996, the FDA chose to classify cigarettes as combination products. The nicotine constituted
a drug while the cigarette and smokeless tobacco formed the “drug delivery device” to deliver the nicotine
to the consumer.204 Deﬁning tobacco products to be combination products as such meant that the FDA
then had jurisdiction under the FDCA to investigate the labeling of the cigarette packages – labels that
lacked claims of therapeutic beneﬁts.205 More speciﬁcally, pursuant to its jurisdiction to regulate “restricted
devices,” 206 and its reasoning that the establishment of such jurisdiction would be necessary to provide
a reasonable assurance of safety for cigarettes,207 the FDA promulgated regulations to change cigarette
package labels. All cigarette labels would be required to contain the statement “A Nicotine-Delivery Device
204See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44397, 45208-16. (August 28, 1996). Nor did such a change in regulatory policy seem to be in
conﬂict at the time that the Food and Drug Administration Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997 was being drafted.
See 143 Cong. Rec. S8851-01, S8859, 1997 WL 545415 (September 4, 1997) (statement of Diane Duﬀy, Legislative Attorney,
American Law Division to Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources).
205Id. at 44402.
206See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (2004), which allows the agency to require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use...
upon such other conditions as [the FDA] may prescribe in such regulation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful eﬀect or
the collateral measures necessary to its use, [the FDA] determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of its
safety and eﬀectiveness.
20761 Fed. Reg. at 44405-07.
44for Persons 18 and Older” to prevent minors from smoking. 208 Such a regulation was in accord with the
FDA’s ﬁnding that if the number of children and adolescents who begin tobacco use can be substantially
diminished, tobacco-related illness can be correspondingly reduced because data suggest that anyone who
does not begin smoking in childhood or adolescence is unlikely ever to begin.209
In response, several tobacco manufacturers, advertisers and retailers ﬁled suit in federal court against the
FDA to challenge the labeling regulation.210 They moved for summary judgment on three grounds: 1) that
the FDA lacked the statutory jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as normally labeled,
2) that the FDA had exceeded its statutory authority under 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) by attempting to regulate
the advertisements and promotions of tobacco products, and 3) that such mandatory advertising restrictions
violated the First Amendment. Although the District Court determined that the FDA had jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products pursuant to the FDCA,211 the court granted the motion in part on the ground
that the mandatory advertising restrictions violated the FDA’s statutory grant under 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e),
thus staying the promulgation of those regulations.212 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit split,
but it reversed the District Court, ﬁnding that the FDA lacked the statutory authority to regulate tobacco
products as they were normally marketed.213 The Fourth Circuit found that Congress did not intend for
the FDA to regulate tobacco products as combination products because, if the FDA had found cigarettes
to be unsafe, they would have had to ban the product completely, rather than just requiring new product
208Id. at 44615-18.
209Id. at 44399.
210See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F.Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
211Id. at 1388.
212Id. at 1398-1401.
213See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998). In his dissent, Judge K.K. Hall stressed that “the FDCA
was broadly worded by design. In an area in which complex new products (and old products, seen in the light of new evidence)
pose the potential for grievous harm, Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to an expert–the FDA–the job of monitoring
drugs.” Id. at 182.
45labels.214 No legislative intent could be found to support the theory that the FDA should regulate tobacco
products, and the court pointed out that the FDA itself had explicitly rejected the regulation of tobacco
products through 1995.215
The case was argued before the Supreme Court late in 1999. Four months later, the Supreme Court aﬃrmed,
5-4, the Middle District of North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the FDCA and the limits
of the FDA’s authority therein.216 The FDA, like other federal agencies, are given wide latitude to interpret
their statutory charge due to their speciﬁc administrative expertise, especially if Congress had not directly
addressed the issue facing the agency.217 But here, the Supreme Court found that the FDA’s regulation of
tobacco was inconsistent with the purpose of the provisions of the FDCA, including the combination product
provision of 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1), and Congress’ tobacco legislation following the passage of the FDCA.
The FDA could not deﬁne a cigarette to be a “drug delivery device,” ﬁnd the device to be “unsafe” and
“dangerous,”218 but then subsequently allow it to remain on the market without violating the mandate of
the FDCA to protect the public health.219 The majority opinion conveyed an “all or nothing” understanding
of the FDA’s ability to regulate the manufacture and packaging of combination products.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, construed 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) in concert with 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) in a
diﬀerent manner. He wrote:
214Id. at 164-67. The FDA is statutorily authorized to prevent products that are “unsafe” from reaching the market.
215Id. at 168-76. In his dissent, Judge Hall reminded the majority of the “familiar canon” of administrative law that allows
an administrative agency to change its regulatory position, especially when new facts are discovered. Id. at 180 (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991)).
216See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2001).
217See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
218See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44412.
219467 U.S. at 135.
46First, the [FDCA]’s language does not restrict the FDA’s remedial powers in
this way. The FDCA permits the FDA to regulate a combination product–
i.e., a device (such as a cigarette) that contains a drug (such as nicotine)–
under its device provisions. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1). And the FDCA’s device
provisions explicitly grant the FDA wide remedial discretion. For example,
where the FDA cannot otherwise obtain reasonable assurance of a device’s
safety and eﬀectiveness, the agency may restrict by regulation a product’s
sale, distribution, or use upon such... conditions as the Secretary may
prescribe. § 360j(e)(1) (emphasis added). And the statutory section that
most clearly addresses the FDA’s power to ban (entitled Banned devices)
says that, where a device presents an unreasonable and substantial risk of
illness or injury, the Secretary may–not must– initiate a proceeding... to
make such device a banned device. § 360f(a) (emphasis added).220
As this excerpt illustrates, Justice Breyer focused upon the permissive language of the FDCA to construe the
FDA’s authority to classify tobacco products as combination products broadly. The disagreement within the
Court over the proper classiﬁcation of cigarettes as “drug delivery devices” presented no statutory obstacle
to Justice Breyer. To begin, the Court did not dispute that nicotine was properly classiﬁed as a drug. To
further construe the cigarette as a device with which to convey the nicotine to the end user not only seemed
appropriate to Justice Breyer, but justiﬁed given the purpose of the FDCA to protect the public health.221
Such a classiﬁcation provided the FDA with a variety of administrative actions regarding the sale of those
restricted devices on the market. The FDA restricted the distribution of tobacco products to minors because
the FDA could not obtain the necessary assurance that tobacco products were safe; § 360f(a) did not require
the FDA to ban tobacco products completely. In other words, Justice Breyer found that the statutory
framework provided by the FDCA allowed the FDA to provide adequate notice to consumers regarding the
safety of cigarettes without requiring the FDA to completely remove an unsafe device from the market:222
221Indeed, Justice Breyer began his dissent, id. at 161, by pointing out that the FDCA, when read literally, provided for the
regulation of tobacco products because those products contained nicotine, an “article (other than food) intended to aﬀect the
structure or any function of the body.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C). Second, the FDCA’s central purpose, to protect the public
health, also argued for the inclusion of tobacco products within the FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 162; see also U.S.
v. Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969)(“FDCA is to be given a liberal construction consistent with [its]
overriding purpose to protect the public health (emphasis added)). The majority disputed neither point in its opinion.
222Id.
47Thus, the statute plainly allows the FDA to consider the relative, overall
safety of a device in light of its regulatory alternatives, and where the FDA
has chosen the least dangerous path, i.e., the safest path, then it can–and
does–provide a reasonable assurance of safety within the meaning of the
statute. A good football helmet provides a reasonable assurance of safety
for the player even if the sport itself is still dangerous. And the safest
regulatory choice by deﬁnition oﬀers a reasonable assurance of safety in a
world where the other alternatives are yet more dangerous.223
Justice Breyer’s dissent arguably supports the goals behind the combination product provision of the SMDA,
even though the majority favored a narrower construction of the FDCA with regards to public health and
safety. The majority emphasized the importance of the public health, but it determined that the public
health was constrained by its interpretation of the authority that Congress delegated to the FDA through
the FDCA. Thus, “no matter how important, conspicuous, and controversial the issue, and regardless of
how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch politically accountable, post,... an administrative
agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from
Congress.”224 Despite its Chevron-like recognition of the FDA’s expertise in regulating products that present
a risk to the public health, the majority seemed to diverge from Chevron, a legally binding precedent, to
focus upon Congress’ explicit delegation to the FDA and Congress’ subsequent, separate tobacco legislation.
Justice Breyer, in contrast, warned that the protection of the public health was not only a source of Chevron-
like deference due to the FDA’s depth of expertise, but that it was in fact at the heart of the valid delegation
made by Congress to the FDA when it enacted the FDCA. Thus, an action taken by the FDA to regulate a
combination product that markedly implicated the public health, even though the FDA had explicitly rejected
224Id. at 161.
48such regulation in the past, was properly within the statutory authority of the FDA.225 This interpretation
supported the goal of the SMDA because section 16 of the SMDA made the FDA’s initial regulation of
tobacco products in 1996 possible and because the SMDA furthered the protection of the public health
in part by providing more stringent and eﬃcient regulation of combination products.226 More broadly,
Justice Breyer construed Congress’ delegation to the FDA through the general purpose of the FDCA and
section 16 of the SMDA to allow the FDA to regulate combination products that implicated the public
health as a means of eﬃciently consolidating within one administrative agency the Chevron-like expertise
needed to best regulate such a product. This interpretation did not carry the day, however, and it appears
the FDA thus may be limited to regulating as combination products, for example, those products that are
more traditionally identiﬁable as a drug/device combination. Yet this litigation and Justice Breyer’s dissent
illustrated the impact that combination products have had on redeﬁning the role of the FDA in protecting
the public health today.
IV. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997
As the preceding section illustrated, the changes that the SMDA eﬀected were felt beyond the statutory
225See id. at 163. Justice Breyer attached “no legal signiﬁcance” to the FDA’s regulatory change of heart, not only because
controlling legal doctrine supported an administrative agency’s change in policy, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 (An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone), but because the FDA obtained evidence throughout the late 1980’s and early
1990’s that the tobacco companies knew of nicotine’s addictive qualities, that the scientiﬁc evidence of the adverse health eﬀects
of tobacco use grew (see 61 Fed. Reg. 44701-06 (August 28, 1996), and because the FDA regulatory policy simply changed
with the advent of a new Administration and a new Commissioner. Id. at 188.
226In its decision to regulate tobacco products as combination products, the FDA applied 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) to regulate
tobacco products as restricted medical devices. Such a designation allowed the FDA to restrict the sale and distribution of
tobacco products to persons over the age of 18 because the FDA could not be assured of the products’ safety. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j(e)(1)(B); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,400 (August 28, 1996). Thus, the FDA did not conclude that tobacco products were
safe for human consumption by allowing their sale to the public.
49prescriptions of the FDCA and the accompanying regulatory practice of the FDA. Still, improvements in the
manner in which combination products were reviewed prior to their market release remained to be made.
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, the next prominent round of
amendments to the FDCA following the SMDA, did not amend the deﬁnition of a combination product or
the substance of those provisions at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g). In full, FDAMA made very little mention of the
regulation of combination products in general or in detail.
FDAMA did provide, however, a measure of autonomy to combination product manufacturers seeking regu-
latory approval for their new products. Section 416 of FDAMA, later codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2 within
the FDCA, allowed the manufacturer to request that its product be classiﬁed as a drug, biological product,
device or combination product.227 In the alternative, section 416 allowed the manufacturer to request that
a particular component of the product guide the decision as to which Center would regulate the product.228
In response, the FDA would provide its determination as to what product classiﬁcation was appropriate or
what component would guide the overall regulation of the product to the manufacturer within sixty days.229
If the FDA failed to make such a decision within sixty days, then the manufacturer’s request would be
considered the ﬁnal determination of either the classiﬁcation of the product or the component that guide
the product’s regulation.230 Such a ﬁnal decision could not be changed unless the manufacturer agreed to
the change in writing or new evidence arose that indicated that the product threatened the public safety.231
Thus, FDAMA in its entirety did not eﬀect sweeping changes in the regulation of combination products.
Through a statutorily imposed time limit on the FDA’s classiﬁcation of each new product seeking approval,
22721 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(a) (2004). See also Pub. L. No. 105-115, Title IV, sec. 416 (November 21, 1997).
228Id.
22921 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(b) (2004).
23021 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(c) (2004).
231Id.
50FDAMA did serve nonetheless to further the SMDA’s goal of an expedited, eﬃcient regulatory process.
V. MDUFMA of 2002: The Advent of the Oﬃce of Combination Products
In 2001, the Executive Director of the Medical Device Manufacturers Association, Stephen Northrup,
addressed the House Committee on Energy and Commerce to discuss the eﬀects and shortcomings of
FDAMA.232 Speciﬁcally, Northrup believed that the SMDA and the FDAMA were only discrete steps on a
continuous journey to keep the FDCA and the FDA’s practices current with technological progress. New
and diﬀerent combination products continued to arrive at the FDA’s doorstep233 such that the Center with
primary premarket review jurisdiction often needed additional expertise from the other Centers. Northrup
predicted that the evolution of these “hybrid” products would be such that their classiﬁcation under one
Center’s primary jurisdiction would become increasingly diﬃcult.234
Northrup’s primary suggestion to ameliorate these problems would eventually prove visionary: he recom-
mended an Oﬃce of Combination Products with “the authority to determine how a combination product
will be reviewed and to coordinate all involvement by and interaction between the various FDA [C]enters in
232Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 2001 WL 475630 (May 3, 2001) (statement of Stephen
Northrup, Executive Director, Medical Device Manufacturers Association).
233Northrup’s testimony cited a few of the latest examples of combination products coming from the medical device arena:
drug-coated stents to ﬁght restenosis, implanted drug-delivery pumps, artiﬁcial organs (such as livers, pancreases, and kidneys),
nerve regenerators, and devices to provide genetic therapies. Id.
234Id. To illustrate this point, Northrup pointed to the Tissue Reference Group (TRG), initially established in 1998 by
CBER and CDRH and comprised of three members of each Center. The TRG provided for device-biologic combination product
manufacturers a single committee to draft guidance documents for these manufacturers and to answer their questions pertaining
to approval jurisdiction and FDA regulations and policy.
51the review of speciﬁc marketing applications.”235 With a goal reminiscent of Senator Kennedy’s comments
during the debates over the SMDA, Northrup sought to encourage eﬃcient use of the FDA’s resources,
increase expertise within the FDA’s staﬀ, and establish accountability for the agency’s actions. He testiﬁed
that such an Oﬃce could eﬃciently operate with a small, “multi-disciplinary” staﬀ that occasionally sought
the additional input of experts from the three Centers. Further, Northrup believed that one Oﬃce would
help to minimize the delays that still haunted the FDA review process for these “hybrid” products because
of disagreements between the staﬀ at diﬀerent Centers, despite the Intercenter Agreements of 1991.236 An
eﬀective response to the appearance of these “hybrid” products that blurred the lines between drugs, devices,
and biological products, in Northrup’s mind, was the creation of an Oﬃce that was equally hybridized in
expertise and resources.
V.A. The First Step: The Combination Products Program
The FDA took the ﬁrst step toward realizing Northrup’s vision when it created the Combination Products
Program (hereinafter “CPP”) in February 2002.237 The program was established within the Oﬃce of the
Ombudsman because the Ombudsman served as the product jurisdiction oﬃcer for combination products,
designating which Center would have primary premarket review jurisdiction.238 The CPP was charged with
“developing a number of initiatives to improve the review and regulation of combination products, including
developing standard operating procedures to improve the management of the intercenter review process,
monitoring the progress of premarket reviews of combination products, and developing guidance on a variety
235Id.
236Id.
237See Regulation of Combination Products: FDA Employee Perspectives, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/perspectives.html
(last visited April 15, 2004). See also H. R. Rep. No. 107-728, at 39 (2002).
238See 21 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1991) (designating Ombudsman as product jurisdiction oﬃcer pursuant to the SMDA).
52of policy issues for combination products.”239 To determine the most pressing issues needing immediate
resolution by the CPP and to formulate a future approach that would improve the eﬃciency of combination
product review, approximately 25 reviewers (both premarket and postmarket) from all three Centers were
interviewed by the CPP.240
Observations from the staﬀ interviews, as well as the recommendations that were issued therein, were pub-
lished by the FDA.241 The interviews focused upon four key areas: consultation and collaboration between
Centers, product jurisdiction, postmarket regulation issues, and electronic submission tracking systems. To
summarize, the employees noted a lack of transparency within the Centers and stressed the need for continued
intercommunication, education and “crosstraining” of combination product reviewers, especially since the
employees believed that assigning combination product review only to experienced reviewers would enhance
their eﬃciency and success in completing reviews. Due to time and resource constraints, reviewers often felt
pressured to complete the review within one Center rather than spending time to obtain a consultation from
another Center. Some reviewers were unsure even how appropriately to contact another Center. The Centers
could not electronically track products within other Centers, nor electronically confer upon the status of that
product. While the request for designation (RFD) procedures worked well generally, the employees noted
that the Intercenter Agreements were outdated and in need of modernization because RFD procedures were
employed rarely and “front-line reviewers” often shouldered the responsibility for determining if product
239See Regulation of Combination Products: FDA Employee Perspectives, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/perspectives.html
(last visited April 15, 2004).
240Id.
241Id. The ﬁndings by the CPP were extensive; in the name of brevity, only the most signiﬁcant results are noted within
this text. In addition to the posting of these ﬁndings and recommendations, the FDA also made available on its website a
new, extensive Manual of Standard Operating Procedures and Policies (“SOPPs”) that would guide the “consultative and
collaborative review process” between Centers when approving combination products. These SOPPs were originally ap-
proved on July 31, 2002 and have since been updated twice. See Intercenter Consultative/Collaborative Review Process,
at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/consultative.html (last visited April 15, 2004).
53jurisdiction was appropriate for their Center. Finally, when postmarket failures did occur, the Center with
lead responsibility for such failure was not always apparent. The recommendations gleaned from the various
Center employees focused upon keeping stakeholders informed of the changes within the FDA and the CPP,
continuing the development of and monitoring of “review programs, policies, [and] processes,” creating trans-
parent procedures that would be easily understood and followed by product manufacturers, and presenting
the CPP as an advocate for the improved eﬃciency of combination product review.242
V.B. The Next Step: The Oﬃce of Combination Products
Nearly eighteen months later, both Houses of Congress were submerged in the ﬁnal stages of sending a
bill to the President that would, in part, incorporate Northrup’s suggestions. Originally sponsored by
Representative James C. Greenwood and presented to the House pursuant to a report from the Committee
on Energy and Commerce,243 H.R. 3580 made its way to the House ﬂoor for consideration on October
7, 2002.244 The bill was entitled “Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002” (hereinafter
“MDUFMA”) and it was drafted primarily to allow CDRH to charge fees to medical device manufacturers
seeking market approval as a means of increasing both CDRH’s funding and its approval rate.
Section 203 of H.R. 3580, entitled “Designation and regulation of combination products,” was primarily
written to address the concerns of the medical device industry, but the resulting provision had a broader
scope. The most extensive Congressional statement with respect to the regulation of combination products
242Id.
243H. R. Rep. No. 107-728 (2002).
244H.R. 3580, 107th Cong., 148 Cong. Rec. H7153-03 (2002) (enacted).
54since the passage of the SMDA, section 203, explicitly required the creation of an Oﬃce of Combination
Products (hereinafter “OCP”).245 Not only did section 203 amend some of the language introduced by
section 16 of the SMDA,246 it introduced the OCP, explained its mission, delineated the boundaries of its
regulatory responsibility and provided for annual Congressional review of the performance of the OCP. The
overall strategy of this provision was to deposit a layer of managerial responsibility and oversight, via the
OCP, between the Commissioner’s oﬃce and the three Centers implicated by combination product review. In
essence, the OCP would be charged with maintaining the delicate balance between an agency head charged
with protecting the national public health and three technologically sophisticated Centers operating at the
outer boundaries of innovation.
To that end, paragraphs (4)(A)-(C) gave the OCP the authority to assign primary premarket approval
jurisdiction to one Center,247 with the possibility of consultation from the Oﬃce of the Commissioner,248
while “overseeing and coordinating reviews” that involved multiple Centers.249 Yet this section also barred
the OCP from preempting the postmarket regulatory authority of any of those Centers.250 Each Center,
in return, would be responsible to the OCP for the timeliness of its product approvals251 and if a dispute
arose regarding the rate at which that Center generated approvals, those disputes would be resolved by the
245Id. at H7158.
246See supra n.112. The amendments to, and not the additions to, the preexisting language of section 16 of the SMDA, 21
U.S.C. § 353(g), by section 203 of H.R. 3580 were necessary to create future statutory agreement between the two amendments
to the FDCA. The modiﬁed language, however, was not revolutionary. Rather, the language modiﬁcations simply provided
that “Section 503(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 353(g)) is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1) -
(A) in the ﬁrst sentence, by striking shall designate a component of the Food and Drug Administration and inserting shall in
accordance with this subsection assign an agency center; and
(B) in each of subparagraphs (A) through (C), by striking the persons charged and inserting the agency center charged;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5)...” 148 Cong. Rec. at H7158.
247H.R. 3580, 107th Cong., § 203(4)(B) (2002).
248Id. at § 203(4)(A).
249Id. at § 203(4)(C).
250Id. at § 203(4)(D) (emphasis added).
251Id. at § 203(E).
55OCP.252 Disputes over more substantive matters, however, such as the claims within the manufacturer’s
market application that could not be resolved by the lead Center would be forwarded to the Oﬃce of the
Commissioner for resolution that could then request input from the OCP.253 Section 203 also called for a
review of the prior agreements and guidance documents that had been generated by the FDA with regard
to the regulation of combination products. That review was to engage the input of each Center’s director.
If such agreements or documents needed modiﬁcation, reapproval, or elimination, FDA was charged with
fulﬁlling that duty.254 Finally, the section that gave birth to the OCP required an annual report with
Congress on the progress of the OCP to date. More speciﬁcally, the report would include “provisions (i)
describing the numbers and types of combination products under review and the timeliness in days of such
assignments, reviews, and dispute resolutions; (ii) identifying the number of premarket reviews of such
products that involved a consulting agency center; and (iii) describing improvements in the consistency of
postmarket regulation of combination products.255
When the report accompanying H.R. 3580 was submitted to the House on October 7, 2002, the legislation
had yet to be debated. No hearings were held before the Committee on Energy and Commerce prior to
the presentation of the report.256 The Committee stressed that the Oﬃce of the Ombudsman (within the
Oﬃce of the Commissioner) would still make the initial determination as to whether a product was indeed
a combination product, but that the Ombudsman could consult with the OCP if necessary to determine the
product’s initial classiﬁcation. The report also made clear that section 203 would continue the administrative
252Id. at § 203(F)(i).
253Id. at § 203(F)(ii).
254Id. at § 203(G).
255Id. at § 203(H).
256H.R. Rep. No. 107-728, at 21 (2002).
56procedure that was originally introduced as the “primary mode of action” determination in the SMDA.257
The section would still permit a manufacturer to submit its application to the Center that it deemed most
appropriate to retain lead approval jurisdiction.258 In all, the Committee’s report indicated that section 203
was aimed mostly at improving the “timeliness” of the premarket approval process of combination products.
Disputes that arose that could not be managed solely within the Center with primary jurisdiction could
be addressed to the Oﬃce of the Commissioner, but as a last resort. Rather, as the report stated, “[t]he
Committee does not intend for the new Oﬃce to be micro-managing line reviewers within the diﬀerent
Agency Centers. The bill instead contemplates that, with respect to the timeliness of reviews, the Centers
themselves will be responsible to the new Oﬃce.”259
An addendum to the Committee on Energy and Commerce’s report was presented to the House on October
15, 2002. The addendum contained the estimated cost (as prepared by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce,
or CBO) of enacting H.R. 3580.260 In all, the CBO determined that H.R. 3580 itself would cost $36
million to implement between 2003 and 2007, at which point the provisions would “sunset,” or no longer
be enforceable, if unsuccessful.261 This estimate, however, did not provide the full picture. For example,
the CBO also estimated that the user fee program would require an additional $78 million in Congressional
appropriations during the same time period to prevent early termination of the user fee program.262 By
sharp contrast, the CBO estimated that the OCP would require $1 million in appropriations for the 2003
257Id. at 39.
258Id. at 39-40.
259Id.
260H.R. Rep. No. 107-728(II) (2002). As the report addendum explained, “CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted in the
fall of 2002 and that outlays will follow historical spending rates for the authorized activities. Where H.R. 3580 speciﬁes the
amounts authorized to be appropriated, CBO assumes that such appropriations will be made. Where appropriations of such
sums as necessary are authorized, CBO assumes that the estimated amounts will be provided for each ﬁscal year.” Id. at 3.
261Id. at 2.
262Id.
57ﬁscal spending year and that an additional $4 million would allow the OCP to operate through 2007.263
The ﬁrst year of operation for the OCP would be more expensive than the following three years, the CBO
estimated, because more staﬀ would be needed to update data with regards to product tracking and to
establish operating procedures for the OCP.264
The debate on the House ﬂoor that followed the presentation of the Committee’s initial report was not
extensive, but was deﬁnitively supportive of section 203.265 Representative Eshoo noted that the provision
would help to “shepherd” combination products through the approval process, thereby allowing the FDA to
focus upon approving the medical devices that patients needed most.266 Representative Greenwood, H.R.
3580’s sponsor, also echoed this theme of eﬃciency and protection of the public by pointing out that section
203 would eliminate the “regulatory logjams” that the FDA faced while ensuring that combination products
were properly classiﬁed and assigned.267 In a unique extension of remarks on the House ﬂoor, Representative
Mark E. Souder of Indiana expressed his approval of the passage of H.R. 3580 because Kosciusko County in
Northern Indiana was one of the nation’s leading sites for production of medical devices.268 He highlighted
the streamlined approval procedures that the OCP would provide for product manufacturers while noting
that “this expedited procedure will not sacriﬁce thoroughness for speed. This legislation carefully spells out
strict standards to ensure the absolute highest level of safety.”269
263Id. at 6.
264Id.
265148 Cong. Rec. at H7162.
266Id.
267Id. at H7163.
268148 Cong. Rec. E1844 (2002).
269Id.
58A little more than one week later, the House was again asked by the Committee on Energy and Commerce
to consider the MDUFMA, but in another form. H.R. 3580 had been abandoned, or more properly, amended
such that H.R. 5651 was now the legislation seeking passage.270 In fact, section 203 became section 204 within
H.R. 5651 because the Committee drafted a new provision as section 203: the debarment of accredited third-
party reviewers of premarket product applications.271 Section 204 in particular was amended, it could be
argued, more fully to incorporate Rep. Greenwood’s theme of timeliness and eﬃciency of review. Since
section 204 of H.R. 5651 was the ﬁnal provision allowing for the creation of the OCP as enacted by Congress
and signed by the President, the full text of this noteworthy legislative development is included here:
270H.R. Res. 5651, 107th Cong., 148 Cong. Rec. H7964 (2002) (enacted) (introduced by Rep. Armey).
271Id. at § 203.
59SEC. 204. DESIGNATION AND REGULATION OF COMBINATION
PRODUCTS.
Section 503(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
353(g)) is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1) -
(A) in the ﬁrst sentence, by striking shall designate a component of the
Food and Drug Administration and inserting shall in accordance with this
subsection assign an agency center; and
(B) in each of subparagraphs (A) through (C), by striking the persons
charged and inserting the agency center charged;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5);
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following paragraph:
(4)(A) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this para-
graph, the Secretary shall establish within the Oﬃce of the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs an oﬃce to ensure the prompt assignment of combina-
tion products to agency centers, the timely and eﬀective premarket review
of such products, and consistent and appropriate postmarket regulation
of like products subject to the same statutory requirements to the extent
permitted by law. Additionally, the oﬃce shall, in determining whether a
product is to be designated a combination product, consult with the com-
ponent within the Oﬃce of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs that is
responsible for such determinations. Such oﬃce (referred to in this para-
graph as the ’Oﬃce’) shall have appropriate scientiﬁc and medical expertise,
and shall be headed by a director.
(B) In carrying out this subsection, the Oﬃce shall, for each combination
product, promptly assign an agency center with primary jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with paragraph (1) for the premarket review of such product.
(C)(i) In carrying out this subsection, the Oﬃce shall ensure timely and
eﬀective premarket reviews by overseeing the timeliness of and coordinating
reviews involving more than one agency center.
(ii) In order to ensure the timeliness of the premarket review of a combina-
tion product, the agency center with primary jurisdiction for the product,
and the consulting agency center, shall be responsible to the Oﬃce with re-
spect to the timeliness of the premarket review.
(D) In carrying out this subsection, the Oﬃce shall ensure the consistency
and appropriateness of postmarket regulation of like products subject to
the same statutory requirements to the extent permitted by law.
(E)(i) Any dispute regarding the timeliness of the premarket review of a
combination product may be presented to the Oﬃce for resolution, unless
the dispute is clearly premature.
(ii) During the review process, any dispute regarding the substance of the
premarket review may be presented to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs
after ﬁrst being considered by the agency center with primary jurisdiction
of the premarket review, under the scientiﬁc dispute resolution procedures
for such center. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs shall consult with
the Director of the Oﬃce in resolving the substantive dispute.
(F) The Secretary, acting through the Oﬃce, shall review each agreement,
guidance, or practice of the Secretary that is speciﬁc to the assignment of
combination products to agency centers and shall determine whether the
agreement, guidance, or practice is consistent with the requirements of this
subsection. In carrying out such review, the Secretary shall consult with
stakeholders and the directors of the agency centers. After such consulta-
tion, the Secretary shall determine whether to continue in eﬀect, modify,
revise, or eliminate such agreement, guidance, or practice, and shall pub-
lish in the Federal Register a notice of the availability of such modiﬁed or
revised agreement, guidance or practice. Nothing in this paragraph shall
be construed as preventing the Secretary from following each agreement,
guidance, or practice until continued, modiﬁed, revised, or eliminated.
(G) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this para-
graph and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the appropriate
committees of Congress on the activities and impact of the Oﬃce. The re-
port shall include provisions-
(i) describing the numbers and types of combination products under review
and the timeliness in days of such assignments, reviews, and dispute reso-
lutions;
(ii) identifying the number of premarket reviews of such products that in-
volved a consulting agency center; and
(iii) describing improvements in the consistency of postmarket regulation
of combination products.
(H) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the regulatory au-
thority of any agency center.; and
(4) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated by paragraph (2) of this section)-
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs (B) and
(C), respectively; and
(B) by inserting before subparagraph (B) the following subparagraph:
(A) The term ’agency center’ means a center or alternative organizational
component of the Food and Drug Administration.272
60The amendments to section 203 of H.R. 3580 that appear within section 204 of H.R. 5651 above have
been italicized to illustrate the thematic changes in agreement with Rep. Greenwood’s position. Paragraph
(4)(A), that originally called for the “timely” premarket review of combination products, now mandated their
“timely and eﬀective” premarket review.273 Paragraph (4)(C) within H.R. 3580 became paragraph (4)(C)(i)
within H.R. 5651, and the word “overseeing” as it related to reviews was modiﬁed to read “overseeing the
timeliness of ...” instead.274 Paragraph (4)(E) within H.R. 3580 became paragraph (4)(C)(ii) within H.R.
5651, and the last sentence of paragraph (4)(D) within H.R. 3580 became paragraph (4)(H) within H.R.
5651.
Of note within paragraph (4)(H), however, is the removal of the word “postmarket” from the phrase “reg-
ulatory authority.”275 With this amendment, section 204(4)(H) would seem to have narrowed the role of
the new OCP before it was even statutorily created. It is arguable that this amendment occurred because
the Committee intended the OCP to occupy a uniquely supervisory role over the smooth functioning and
intercommunication of the three Centers rather than conducting the premarket approval review of combina-
tion products itself. Each of the three Centers would still complete the premarket approval of the products
appropriately classiﬁed to them, using the same staﬀ and same approval procedures as in the past, while
the OCP monitored their progress and collaboration. Thus, it was appropriate, if not necessary, to vest
continued regulatory authority in each Center (notably the Center with primary jurisdiction for combina-
tion products) because that Center would be directly responsible for its decision to the OCP pursuant to §
204(4)(C)(ii).
273Id. at § 204(4)(A).
274Id. at § 204(4)(C)(i).
275Id. at § 204(4)(H). See supra n.250.
61The amended responsibilities of the OCP within section 204 of H.R. 5651 were passed by the House on
October 16, 2002.276 The following day, the Senate continued the debate surrounding these provisions in
anticipation of its own vote.277 As Senator Kennedy pointed out, “We have been working on this legislation
for 10 years. It has been a divisive issue, both the issue and as a public policy issue... I indicate [that] this is
a public health matter of enormous importance and consequence.”278 The bill passed in the Senate that day
as well, indicating the universal approval for the provisions that would amend the FDCA and “bring FDA
regulation into the 21st century.”279 H.R. 5651 was presented to President George W. Bush on October
25, 2002280 and the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 became law on October 26,
2002.281
VI. The Current Status of the Oﬃce of Combination Products
With the President’s signing of the MDUFMA on October 26, 2002, the OCP became a statutory respon-
sibility of the FDA. There was no doubt that its advent was overdue. FDA stakeholders reported that the
number of new combination products seeking premarket approval was expected to continue to increase.282
276148 Cong. Rec. at H7964-65.
277148 Cong. Rec. S10752 (October 17, 2002).
278148 Cong. Rec. at S10619. Perhaps in a more pointed display of his support for H.R. 5651, Senator Kennedy proceeded,
“If Members are going to object, they are going to have to come to the ﬂoor of the Senate and express those objections and
reasons. We will not tolerate someone holding up this bill in hopes that they can get it carried back to the House.” Id.
279148 Cong. Rec. at 10754 (statement by Sen. Gregg).
280148 Cong. Rec. H8043 (October 28, 2002).
281See supra n.2.
282See Overview of the Oﬃce of Combination Products, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/overview.html (last visited
April 15, 2004).
62Recent examples of such sophisticated products include a glucose meter that integrated an insulin pump with
a dose calculator,283 dermal collagen implants for aesthetic use,284 and a drug-eluting stent used to unclog
heart arteries.285 Congress provided the OCP with a broad statutory grant to oversee the entire “regulatory
life cycle” of a combination product, from assigning the product to one Center with primary review jurisdic-
tion, to coordinating a timely and eﬀective premarket review process when the product required input from
multiple Centers, to providing uniform postmarket procedures. In addition, the OCP would be expected to
resolve intercenter disputes arising over the proper review procedures to be applied by helping to guide and
reformulate the procedures themselves. Finally, such decisions as the OCP made would be subject to annual
Congressional review.286
VI.A. The First Public Hearing
Despite these broad mandates, the unavoidable challenge for the FDA still came in making the OCP a reality.
The discussion, supra, of the ﬁndings and recommendations of the CPP, gleaned from the perspectives of
Center employees, illustrated a multilayered problem of intercommunication breakdowns, outdated proce-
dures used by a staﬀ that was limited in time and resources, and a lack of crosstraining between Centers for
diﬀerent types of combination products. Thus, the FDA approached the incorporation of the OCP into the
Oﬃce of the Commissioner in a methodical, stepwise fashion. At base, confusion surrounding and concerns
about the manner in which the Centers within the FDA should be regulating combination products day
283See FDA Clears New Diabetes Device for Marketing, at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00918.html (last
visited April 15, 2004).
284See CosmoDermTM 1 Human-Based Collagen, CosmoDermTM 2 Human-Based Collagen, and CosmoPlastTM Human-Based
Collagen P800022S050, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/pdf/p800022S050.html (last visited April 15, 2004).
285See FDA Approves Drug-Eluting Stent for Clogged Heart Arteries, at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00896.html
(last visited April 15, 2004). For more examples of recently approved combination products, see Recent Examples of Combi-
nation Product Approvals, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/approvals.html (last visited April 15, 2004).
286Id.
63to day would need resolution before the FDA could establish the OCP to oversee the subsequent, smooth
intercommunication between the Centers.
Although the Commissioner of Food and Drugs approved a press release about the new OCP on December 31,
2002,287 the FDA published a notice in the Federal Register just two days after the passage of the MDUFMA
to invite public comment at a hearing on November 25, 2002 with regards to the “assignment, premarket
review, and postmarket regulation of combination products.”288 Within this notice, there was no mention
of the OCP, but rather the notice cited the CPP within the Oﬃce of the Ombudsman.289 That omission,
however, may have been either the result of a public notice that had been drafted for the Federal Register
prior to the passage of the MDUFMA or an implicit recognition that, once the MDUFMA was enacted,
the OCP would assume formally the duties of the CPP.290 What the notice did allude to, however, were
the concerns that product manufacturers had about the lack of clarity, eﬃciency, and predictability of the
FDA’s combination product approval mechanisms.291 To that end, the FDA requested that organizations
interested in commenting on the current status of combination product review answer a variety of questions
ranging from the ﬂexibility of the Intercenter Agreements to the deﬁnition of “primary mode of action” to
whether a product should be subject to one or more applications for premarket approval.292
287See supra n.1.
28867 Fed. Reg. 65801 (October 28, 2002).
289See supra n.237.
290See H. R. Rep. No. 107-728, at 39 (2002) (expressing the Committee’s intent that the OCP would continue the eﬀorts of
the CPP). See also Overview of the Oﬃce of Combination Products, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/overview.html
(last visited April 15, 2004) (noting that “The Oﬃce also has assumed the functions of the Combination Products Program
begun in 2002 within the FDA Oﬃce of the Ombudsman. Among these functions [are] working with FDA Centers to develop
guidance or regulations to clarify the agency regulation of combination products [and] serving as a focal point for combination
products issues for internal and external stakeholders.”)
291Id. at 65802.
292Id. at 65803.
64Attendees at the public hearing represented a wide variety of professional backgrounds and regulatory inter-
ests. Physicians, laboratory researchers, attorneys and manufacturing executives all weighed in with their
impressions of how the future of combination product review should be shaped.293 One of the FDA panelists
overseeing the hearing was Dr. Mark Kramer, Director of the Combination Products Program within the
Ombudsman’s Oﬃce. At least one participant noted that the outcome of this hearing was, in part, necessary
to guide the immediate future of the OCP.294
While many of the speakers encouraged the FDA to increase its eﬃciency and oversight procedures in general
terms,295 a few participants made noteworthy suggestions. Dr. Barbara D. Boyan, Ph.D., who spoke on
behalf of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, advocated for a “multidisciplinary” approach,296
in which a team of physicians, scientists, and engineers would work cooperatively to review a combination
product from the time that the product application is submitted to its ﬁnal approval. She also proposed that
the “primary mode of action” of a product include its method of use.297 Ultimately, Dr. Boyan, and many
of the other speakers at the hearing, strongly urged the FDA to limit the review process to one application
for each combination product.298
Continuing a previous theme, Dr. Paul Goldfarb, M.D., who represented Genetronics, Inc., encouraged the
293Transcript of the Public Hearing on November 25, 2002 on FDA Regulation of Combination Products, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/transcript112502.html (last visited April 11, 2004).
294Id. (statement of Dr. Murray Lumpkin, FDA Principal Associate Commissioner).
295Id. (see, e.g., statement of Dr. Owen Fields, Ph.D., Regulatory Aﬀairs, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals).
296Id. Dr. Fields referred to this as an “intercenter review team.”
297Id. Ms. Ashley Whitesides, Esq., King & Spaulding, concurred that those products that were intended for identical uses
should be categorized together and primarily regulated by the same Center.
298Id. Other speakers, however, argued that certain combinations contain two or more components that are diverse enough to
require separate approval applications. One example of such a product was a magnetic resonance system, where the drug that
provided the imaging eﬀect, never physically contacted the device.
65FDA to consider the primary mode of action from the patient’s perspective.299 Dr. Goldfarb, in conjunction
with Dr. Fields and a few other speakers, believed that the therapeutic eﬀect of the product should weigh
heavily in the determination of the primary mode of action.300 Such an interpretation would continue the
historical approach of the FDA in determining the primary mode of action and building the OCP’s approach
from that point.301 Another expert argued that premarket approval lead jurisdiction should be granted to
the Center best equipped to assess the product’s risk and to assure the safety of the product to patients.302
Finally, Dr. Stuart Portnoy, M.D., formerly a FDA Branch Chief of the Interventional Cardiology Devices
Branch, voiced a unique position when he argued that “it is essential for the reviewers of combination
products to continue to work from within their respective centers, and not be pulled out to populate this
new oﬃce.”303 He believed that the product reviewers within each Center would only maintain their speciﬁc
expertise if they stayed within those Centers. Thus, the “cross-center review teams” should not be abandoned
in favor of the “multidisciplinary” approach advanced by Dr. Boyan and the OCP should occupy the role
intended for it by Congress: administrator of FDA inter-Center communication.304
From this hearing, the FDA promulgated a ﬁnal ruling, published in the Federal Register on June 23, 2003.305
299Id.
300Id. Mr. Michael Gross, Vice President of Worldwide Compliance for Aventis Behring, a biologics manufacturer, agreed.
301Id. (statement of David Fox, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, LLP). Mr. Fox disagreed that multiple applications presented an
eﬃciency problem for combination product review as the intercommunication and coordination between Centers had increased.
Ms. Patricia Shrader, Esq., Corporate Vice President of Regulatory Aﬀairs and Compliance at Becton, Dickinson and the
company spokesperson of AdvaMed, which is the largest medical technology association in the world, agreed that the historical
approach to determining the primary mode of action was the most appropriate approach. Her position, however, was predicated
upon an argument based in industrial and administrative inertia that thousands of manufacturers had come to rely upon the
historical deﬁnition of the primary mode of action in ﬁling their own applications, such that a change at this time would create
unnecessary confusion.
302Id. (statement of Dr. Guy Chamberland, Ph.D., Vice President of Regulatory Aﬀairs and Drug Development, Angiogene,
Inc.). Dr. Fields proposed a similar idea, as did Dr. Zorina Pitkin, Ph.D., Vice President of Regulatory Aﬀairs and Quality
Systems at Nephros Therapeutics, Inc. Mr. Fox, by contrast, largely discounted this consideration because any Center at
FDA could provide the appropriate safety and eﬀectiveness information, regardless of whether the Center had primary review
jurisdiction.
303Id.
304Id.
30568 Fed. Reg. 37075-01 (June 23, 2003).
66The ruling explained how some of the regulations that had been promulgated as the result of the passage
of the SMDA, 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.1 et seq., would require further amendment as a result of the MDUFMA.
Those changes, however, were mostly superﬁcial. The major suggestions advanced by many of the speakers
at the public hearing were not incorporated into the OCP’s formal regulatory framework. Section 3.1, the
statement of purpose behind these combination product regulations, was modiﬁed to cite the MDUFMA as
one source of authority for the combination product regulations.306 Section 3.2 was amended to make the
deﬁnitions of “agency component” and “agency center,” (as both were used within the FDCA) compatible,
and section 3.6 was revised to cite the OCP as the combination product jurisdiction oﬃcer, rather than the
Ombudsman.307 Designating the OCP as the new product jurisdiction oﬃcer meant that the OCP would
now make the original determination as to which Center would have primary premarket review responsibility
for combination products and for products whose review jurisdiction was in dispute.308 Sections 3.7 and 3.9
were also modiﬁed in minor ways to correlate with the FDA’s current organizational structure.309
VI.B. The First Six Months
Between the public hearing in November 2002 and the issuance of the ﬁnal rule that modiﬁed the OCP’s
governing regulations, the OCP issued two quarterly progress reports to its stakeholders.310 The ﬁrst re-
port explicitly stated that the OCP was focusing on establishing procedures in furtherance of its statutory
30621 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2003); 68 Fed. Reg. at 37077.
30721 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.6 (2003); 68 Fed. Reg. at 37077.
308See Assignment of Combination Products/Product Jurisdiction Program, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/assignment.html
(last visited April 16, 2004). See also Overview of the Oﬃce of Combination Products, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/overview.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
30921 C.F.R. §§ 3.7,. 3.9 (2003); 68 Fed. Reg. at 37077.
310First Quarterly Progress Report to Stakeholders, January – March 2003 (“First Quarterly Re-
port”), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/firstquarter2003.html (last visited April 15, 2004). Sec-
ond Quarterly Progress Report to Stakeholders, April – June 2003 (“Second Quarterly Report”), at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/secondquarter2003.html (last visited April 15, 2004).
67responsibilities; to that end, it highlighted in a succinct fashion its actions during its ﬁrst three months of
existence. During the ﬁrst three months of 2003, the OCP received six requests for product assignment and
issued four of those assignments. Of those four assignments, all of them were issued within sixty days of the
OCP’s receipt of the request; the average review time was 37 days311 Two products were primarily assigned
to CBER, and one of each of the remaining products was assigned to CDER and CDRH.
In addition to this statistical data, the OCP stated that it was working to adapt the deﬁnition of “primary
mode of action,” probably in response to the statements at the public hearing, and that proposed deﬁnitions
were being used in test cases.312 A new “internal precedent documentation system” was established to
allow each Center to retroactively catalog old assignment decisions and to refer to prior relevant precedents
when confronted with a new application.313 More importantly, the OCP developed an electronic, web-
based database that would allow the Centers to track the progress of each consultation request made on a
combination product. The OCP also revised the SOPPs of the Intercenter Consultative/Collaborative Review
Process314 utilized by the Centers to complement the use of the electronic database. Not forgetting that the
OCP was charged with overseeing the “entire regulatory cycle” of combination products, new working groups
were formed within the OCP to create guidance documents that would inform manufacturers in advance
of the role that the Centers expected to play in continuing postmarket monitoring of speciﬁc combination
products. The report noted that CDRH and CDER especially would be implicated by this new procedure
because they anticipated a marked increase in a speciﬁc category of combination product that would require
this monitoring in the future. In essence, the ﬁrst quarterly progress report captured the OCP at a “feet-
311See First Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
312Id.
313Id.
314See supra n.241.
68wetting” stage, as it began its oversight responsibilities through meetings with various groups of stakeholders
and debrieﬁngs with the staﬀ of Center review teams, and as it responded to inquiries ﬁelded by both FDA
staﬀ and product manufacturers.315
One particularly innovative approach that was tentatively adopted by the OCP was cited brieﬂy in the
report. Section 204 of the MDUFMA charged the OCP with the “timely and eﬀective” premarket review of
combination products.316 The OCP noted that two Centers interacted often enough on a range of combi-
nation products that a “two-Center, two-application collaborative premarket review” could provide a more
appropriate and eﬃcient means of reviewing a new combination product without minimizing each Center’s
input or expertise. After one such collaborative team had completed a premarket review with this new
application, the OCP debriefed the other Center review teams and planned to debrief the manufacturer later
on the results of the trial inter-Center collaboration. The OCP hoped that the feedback that was generated
by the test review team would help it to generate tools to use in further collaborative premarket reviews
with other teams.317
Another noteworthy choice disclosed in the ﬁrst quarterly report was the balancing act that the infant OCP
undertook. Many of the steps taken immediately following the enactment of the MDUFMA by the OCP were
directed at modernizing current regulatory practices by the Centers and facilitating their intercommunica-
tion. Yet the report also disclosed that the OCP jumped headlong into breaking new administrative ground.
315See First Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
316See supra n.272.
317See First Quarterly Report, supra n.310. This inter-Center, team-oriented or “multidisciplinary” approach also was advo-
cated for by some of the speakers at the public hearing. See supra n.296.
69Working groups were established to “clarify and develop the regulatory pathways for novel drug delivery
systems and drug/test kit combination products based on pharmacogenomics. OCP [was] also participating
in the working groups being established to develop guidance documents for products for diabetes and obe-
sity.”318 These steps were part of the “Commissioner’s Technology Development Initiatives.”319 Such an
assertive move, to resolve old problems while simultaneously laying the groundwork to regulate cutting-edge
technology, revealed an experienced sophistication and dedication that belied the brand-new veneer of the
OCP.
The second quarterly progress report provided to stakeholders also drew a concise, yet illustrative, picture
of the continuing evolution of the OCP.320 Product jurisdiction reviews were ﬁnally consolidated within the
OCP, completing the transfer from the Oﬃce of the Ombudsman. The OCP promulgated the ﬁnal rule in the
Federal Register on June 23, 2003.321 As expected, the OCP continued to oversee and facilitate inter-Center
communication. It accomplished this, in part, by completing a retrospective analysis of consultative reviews
completed during the ﬁrst six months of 2003. Regulatory challenges that still needed resolution included
whether an updated deﬁnition of the “primary mode of action” was necessary and whether a single product
application or separate applications, managed by inter-Center review teams, more eﬀectively furthered the
OCP’s responsibility to approve combination products in a “timely and eﬀective” way. As before, the OCP
forged ahead with creating regulatory pathways for new combination products and establishing a new working
group to consider whether cross-labeling of some combination products was feasible.322 Postmarket review
318See First Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
319Id.
320See Second Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
321See supra n.305.
322Although no example is provided, cross-labeling issues may arise when a combination product consists of two physically
distinct components that are intended for concomitant use. See, e.g., supra n.133, 298.
70factors, such as adverse events, good manufacturing practices, and the registration of approved combination
products, were elucidated further by OCP working groups. Physically, the OCP consolidated itself into one
location, added and trained new staﬀ, and continued to expand its website by providing links to guidance
documents and examples of recently approved combination products.
In fact, many of the changes brought about by the OCP in the second quarter dealt with enhancing its
electronic capabilities. The internal request for designation (RFD) database that contained prior approval
precedents continued to be updated, as was the web-enabled database that allowed each of the Centers to
track, monitor, and complete consultation requests between Centers.323 Work began on an OCP “intranet”
site that would allow OCP staﬀ to access all the pertinent information related to the regulation of combination
products. An “algorithm and categorization scheme” was implemented also on the web to aid in describing
how diﬀerent types of combination products were currently deﬁned by the OCP.
Three new RFDs were submitted to the OCP and five more combination products were assigned to Cen-
ters, all of which were drug-device combinations. Three of those assignments were holdovers from the ﬁrst
quarterly progress report. Again, all assignments were made within sixty days of receipt of the RFD from
the manufacturer. Thus, after six months of operation, the OCP had completed nine combination product
assignments to the three Centers, with one assignment remaining.324
323See Second Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
324Id.
71Delving deeper into the statistics provided in the second quarterly report, the mean325 “total FDA review
time,” or the time elapsed between receipt of the RFD from the manufacturer and the action letter generated
by the OCP with the Center assignment for the product, was shortened by nearly a day. The median326 total
review time, however, increased from 36.5 to 40 days. While this trend would not comfort the supporters of
the OCP because it did not indicate a more timely and eﬀective review process, the import of this statistic
was lessened when viewed against the range of total FDA review times. In the ﬁrst quarter, review times
ranged between 29 and 46 days.327 In the second quarter, by contrast, review times ranged between 18 and
47 days.328 Thus, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003, half of the product assignment reviews were completed in 29
to 36.5 days and half were completed in 36.5 to 46 days. In the second quarter of 2003, once the OCP had
assumed completely the reins of product assignment from the Oﬃce of the Ombudsman, half of the product
assignments took between 18 and 40 days, and the other half of the assignments were made in 40 to 47
days. So the median shifted upwards from the ﬁrst to the second quarter of 2003, but the mean review time
changed a negligible amount, and the total review time for at least one product was shortened by eleven
days. While the sample set of combination products used in these statistics was not extensive,329 the message
conveyed by the statistics enhances the theme of the second quarterly progress report outlined above: the
undeniable advantages in time and communication that accrued to both the FDA and combination product
manufacturers as a result of the OCP’s consolidated oversight.
VI.C. The First Year Draws to a Close
325The “mean,” in statistics, is the average value of a set of numbers. American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (4th ed. 2000).
326The “median,” in statistics, is the middle value in a distribution, above and below which lie an equal number of values.
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000).
327See First Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
328See Second Quarterly Report, supra n.310.
329Recall that the OCP completed only four product assignments in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 and ﬁve product assignments in
the second quarter. See supra n.310.
72Although the OCP was oﬃcially created on December 24, 2002, the MDUFMA was enacted on October
26, 2002. Included within the MDUFMA was section 204(4)(G), that required the OCP to ﬁle a report
with the appropriate Congressional committee “[n]ot later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this paragraph and annually thereafter...”330 Also included within this statutory section were the three
requirements that the OCP must satisfy within its report, namely a description of the (1) types of reviews
undertaken by the OCP and their timely completion, (2) the consultations undertaken between Centers, and
(3) the advances made in standardizing postmarket product regulation.331 On October 26, 2003 the OCP
presented its annual report to Congress to explain its progress through July 31, 2003.332
The annual report read much like an introductory primer to members of Congress and the general public who
had not followed closely the creation and development of the OCP since late 2002. In fact, the report voiced
the same preliminary concerns that were expressed at the beginning of the ﬁrst quarterly progress report,
produced at the end of March 2003.333 The broad responsibilities of the OCP, as well as its more speciﬁc
regulatory goals, were reiterated as well. The report explained in more detail the OCP’s “performance” and
its “additional activities and impacts” in each of the three statutorily speciﬁed areas.
VI.C.I. “Prompt Assignment of Combination Products”
330MDUFMA, section 204(4)(G), 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(4)(G) (2004). See also supra n.272.
331Id.
332Annual Report to Congress, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/congressreport.html (last visited April 16, 2004).
The entire report is twenty-three pages and therefore, an exhaustive examination of each ﬁnding by the OCP is beyond the
conﬁnes of this paper. A summary of those ﬁndings, however, will still serve to illustrate the advances achieved by the OCP
through July 31, 2003.
333See supra n.310.
73By July 31, 2003, the OCP had received twelve RFDs for combination products and had assigned ten of
those products to one of the three Centers; one request was withdrawn and the ﬁnal request had not been
assigned but was not behind schedule.334 The ten assignments that had been made were all made within
sixty days of the OCP’s receipt of each RFD, as mandated by 21 C.F.R. § 3.8. In a minimal departure from
the statistics of the second quarterly progress report, the mean total review time increased again to 36.9
days, the median total review time decreased by one day to 39 days, and the range of review times increased
again equal to the range originally cited in the ﬁrst quarterly progress report, between 29 and 46 days. The
minimal change in these statistics implied that the OCP may have settled into its expected rate of product
assignment by the end of its seventh month.
Aside from the performance statistics used to illustrate the OCP’s initial success in assigning Center jurisdic-
tion, the report detailed additional steps by the OCP to act on its assignment role. Many of the ﬁndings were
repetitive of what was cited in the ﬁrst two quarterly progress reports, such as the responses to stakeholder
inquiries and the establishment of the RFD database to serve as prior assignment precedent. Of especial note
in the annual report, however, was the ﬁnding regarding the deﬁnition of the “primary mode of action.” The
OCP stated that a team comprised of employees from the OCP, each Center, and the Oﬃce of Chief Counsel
(OCC) was still working on creating a clearer standard to be employed when the FDA made jurisdictional
decisions.335 The result of that work was expected to change 21 C.F.R. part 3 (the applicable combination
product regulations) to include that new standard. Assignment letters sent to product manufacturers were
334See supra n.332.
335Id.
74modiﬁed to explain the full scope of regulatory requirements that each product would face. Finally, the
OCP reinstated monthly meetings between its “jurisdictional and assignment specialists” and the separate
Center product jurisdiction oﬃcers to discuss pending RFDs and enhance the uniformity of cross-Center
decisions.336
VI.C.II. “Timely and Eﬀective Premarket Review”
The performance statistics provided by the OCP to illustrate its “timely and eﬀective” actions were more
complex than those cited in its assignment decisions. First, the Centers had to adopt a system of designating
applications as including a combination product; that adoption became eﬀective on April 1, 2003. In response,
two of the Centers, CBER and CDER, made that designation at the time that the application was submitted.
CDRH, by contrast, made that designation once the review decision about the product had been made.337
Thus, when the OCP reported that 49 applications between April 1, 2003 and July 31, 2003 were classiﬁed as
combination products, 38 of those applications were received by CBER and CDER and the remaining eleven
applications that came from CDRH were actually applications with ﬁnal decisions attached to them. The
OCP further noted that too little time had passed between the adoption of this classiﬁcation scheme and the
preparation of the annual report to draw any meaningful conclusion about the timeliness and eﬀectiveness of
the Centers’ review procedures for NDAs, BLAs, or PMAs involving combination products.338 The OCP did
note that between May 1, 2003 and July 31, 2003, however, all of the ﬁnal decisions that CDRH issued with
respect to four combination product 510(k) applications were reviewed within their statutory timeframes.339
336Id.
337Id.
338Id. For information on NDAs, see supra n.28. For information on PMAs, see supra n.50. For information on BLAs, see
supra n.69.
339Id. For information on 510(k) applications, see supra n.51.
75One other statistic compiled by the OCP for the report tracked the number of inter-Center consultations
that were solicited prior to July 31, 2003. CBER asked for 24 consultations (mostly with CDRH), CDER
asked for 14 consultations (drawing heavily from CDRH too), and CDRH requested 43 consultations (forty
of which were with CDER). The OCP noted that many applications actually required multiple consultations
and that applications received prior to April 1, 2003 for which consultations were solicited were not reﬂected
in these data. Not all inter-Center consultations may have been recorded during the initialization of this
procedure immediately after April 1, 2003. Once the web-enabled database was completed, however, the
OCP anticipated the automatic recording of these consultation requests.340
The extensive nature of the changes that were documented by the OCP in this area indicated that the OCP
had devoted much of its energy during the ﬁrst half of 2003 to completing more “timely and eﬀective” product
reviews.341 Again, many of the cited changes reiterated what had been explained to stakeholders in the
quarterly progress reports. Generally, the OCP worked strenuously to facilitate inter-Center communication,
from the implementation of an inter-Center mail courier system, to repeated training sessions on inter-Center
consultations, to active monitoring of those consultations and of multidisciplinary review teams employing
the revised Standard Operating Procedures,342 to modernized internal electronic databases. An internal
working group was charged with simplifying submission procedures, while another group was aided by OCP
340Id.
341For an update of the OCP’s rate of product assignment between October 1, 2003 and March 31, 2004, see FY04 OCP Review
Performance: Formal Requests for Designation Submitted by Industry, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/fy04rfd.html
(last visited September 6, 2004). In that period, the OCP made 12 combination product assignments, mostly to CDRH, and
spent between 20 and 58 days reviewing those requests for designation.
342See supra n.241.
76in establishing speciﬁc review processes for “complex regulatory issues.”343 Finally, a retrospective review of
these consultations and an analysis of the feedback solicited from Center employees involved in those product
consultations informed the OCP as to how to coordinate future inter-Center communications.
VI.C.III. “Consistent and Appropriate Postmarket Regulation”
The third and ﬁnal area that the OCP was assigned by statute to manage was the consistent oversight of
combination product postmarket regulation. Although the OCP did not eﬀect as much change in this area
as it did in the premarket review arena, new postmarket reporting requirements for combination products
were conceived by drawing from other regulatory sources.344 In essence, the OCP’s actions indicated that a
more uniform and more tailored postmarket regulation of combination products could occur only if product
manufacturers were informed properly at every step of the regulatory cycle. As mentioned supra, the OCP
modiﬁed the assignment letters initially sent to manufacturers to be more explicit about the regulatory
requirements that a manufacturer could expect. Then, at the end of the regulatory review process, the OCP
saw a further chance to explain its expectations. Not only would the OCP actively support the Centers
in their speciﬁc postmarket regulatory requirements, but it had already formed a working group to update
policy and guidance statements on good manufacturing practices, quality system regulations, adverse event
reports, and registration and listing mechanisms for approved combination products.345
VI.D. Moving Forward
343See supra n.332.
344Id. Statistical analysis was not presented by the OCP in this area.
345Id.
77The regulation of combination products, while requiring a clear framework based upon common product
classiﬁcations and accepted administrative channels, must be ﬂexible enough to manage the ever increasing
sophistication of new products. To that end, the OCP has proposed at least two changes in its own oversight
procedures. It has drafted a guidance to manage timeliness disputes, when the lead Center has not reviewed
and acted on the manufacturer’s product submission in an appropriate time frame.346 The guidance would
help to deﬁne when the dispute should be presented to the OCP for resolution. On another oversight front,
the OCP issued a proposed rule on May 7, 2004 to codify the deﬁnition of “primary mode of action”347
and to expedite the process of assigning product regulation to one Center by giving a manufacturer an
“assignment algorithm” to use when requesting a product classiﬁcation pursuant to the newly deﬁned primary
mode of action.348 Providing a deﬁnition for “primary mode of action,” the OCP believes, would clarify
the regulatory process. In addition, while the new deﬁnition would further the OCP’s current practice of
assigning jurisdiction based upon the primary mode of action, it would enhance that practice by providing
a regulatory route when the primary mode of action can not be clearly determined.349
The OCP then allowed the comment period on its deﬁnition to extend through August 20, 2004, to permit
product manufacturers and other interested parties to oﬀer their alternative deﬁnitions or suggestions.350
The primary mode of action would be “the single mode of action of a combination product that provides the
most important therapeutic action of the combination product.”351 If the most important therapeutic352
346See Draft Guidance for Industry: Combination Products Timeliness of Premarket Reviews Dispute Resolution Guidance,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/dispute.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
347See supra n.108.
348FDA Proposes Rule on Combination Products, at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/ANS01288.html (last vis-
ited September 6, 2004); see http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/pmoaslides/sld001.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
See also 69 Fed. Reg. 25527 (May 7, 2004).
349See http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/pmoaslides/sld007.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
350See 69 Fed. Reg. 35277 (June 24, 2004).
351See http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/pmoaslides/sld004.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
352The OCP would deﬁne “mode of action” as “the means by which a product achieves a therapeutic eﬀect.” The term
“therapeutic” would include “any eﬀect of action of the combination product intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or
78action could not be determined, then the proposed assignment algorithm would be applied. Any assignment of
Center jurisdiction would seek ﬁrst to maintain regulatory consistency.353 In other words, a new combination
product should be assigned to the Center that has experience in managing other products that raise the same
questions of safety and eﬀectiveness. If institutional consistency could not be preserved, perhaps because
there are no similar older products, then the algorithm would dictate that the Center with the most related
experience to the safety and eﬀectiveness issues of the new product would receive jurisdiction.354 Such a
deﬁnition and its accompanying algorithm, if adopted by the OCP at all, would be eﬀective after the date
of any ﬁnal rule based upon this proposal. At this time, the OCP’s ﬁnal decision as to this deﬁnition and
algorithm is pending, but the result will inevitably encompass the input of both private and public sector
entities.
VII. Conclusion
The ﬁrst annual report to Congress, now nine months old, in reality captured just the ﬁrst seven months
of the OCP’s existence. Yet, it represented the culmination of decades of work on the part of the FDA to
regulate the forefront of medical technology. Such a broad delegation of authority as the OCP received from
the MDUFMA, to restore the cooperation between Centers confronted by divergent considerations while
charting new administrative territory over combination products that defy traditional classiﬁcations, could
have overwhelmed the infant Oﬃce before it could eﬀect even one signiﬁcant change. But the OCP drew on
prevent disease, or aﬀect the structure or any function of the body.” Combination products would be expected to have more
than one mode of action. See http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/pmoaslides/sld002.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
353See http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/pmoaslides/sld005.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
354See http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/pmoaslides/sld006.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
79its greatest strength to bear that authority: the expertise and the cooperation of the staﬀ already employed
by its sister Centers. Perhaps in one regard, then, the OCP was given a simpler task than it ﬁrst appeared.
The dedication to regulatory integrity and procedural fairness was already present in the reviewers and the
jurisdiction oﬃcers. The OCP had just to bring these people together and to initiate a dialogue among them,
whether through inter-Center review teams, or internal electronic databases, or employee training sessions.
To examine this relationship one step further, however, is to discover that such a reunion of experience
is not simple. Decades of ad hoc decision making by the Centers, although tempered by the Intercenter
Agreements of 1991, had created three unique pathways of approval that caused confusion among the Centers
and consumed the temporal and ﬁnancial resources of product manufacturers. The OCP had to interface
diﬀerent regulatory methods for markedly diﬀerent products from the point of application to the point of
product approval. Electronic resources had to be created. Consultation and collaboration had to be initiated
and nurtured consistently. What the annual report provided was proof that such a reunion could occur, and
in fact it had occurred.
Several observations about the future of the OCP could be made with relative certainty. The OCP will
probably continue its web-enabled march to facilitate communication among the Centers, as the wireless
Internet and other electronic advances make paper and telephones obsolete. New products will challenge
the strength of that intercommunication routinely, as the forefront of science (especially with respect to
drug-device combinations) pushes into unexplored and unimagined territory. A new generation of FDA staﬀ
will be raised on such intercommunication without sacriﬁcing its sense of responsibility toward the health of
80the American public. Although the MDUFMA provides sunset provisions for the OCP, beginning in 2007,
it is acknowledged currently that the OCP will become so integral to the eﬃcient and eﬀective operation of
the Centers that its dissolution will not, and in truth could not, occur. Thus, Congress should be content
with the knowledge that, while the OCP would have been an appropriate addition to the FDA even in 1990,
its creation in 2002 came not a moment too soon.
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